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 Viscerally divisive sociopolitical issues with clear boundaries often raise 
questions of constitutional legality. Unfortunately, the Constitution does not offer 
guidance on a preferred method of interpretation, and so legal scholars and Supreme 
Court justices alike have yet to reach a consensus. Consequently, there is still debate over 
how a principled case can be made for the constitutional protection of rights not 
originally covered by constitutional amendments; the legal debate over same-sex 
marriage reflects this dilemma. 
 For same-sex marriage the question of interpretation is particularly concerned 
with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and by extension the 
rational-basis test. This test asks whether a statute that classifies people is rationally 
related to a government interest. When lower courts have found a rational basis for laws 
prohibiting same-sex marriage it has historically been on moral or traditional grounds. 
Recently there have been several court cases that applied the Fourteenth Amendment and 
did not find a rational basis for the prohibition of same-sex marriage. 
 This paper analyzes current methods of constitutional exegesis from a practicable 
and historical perspective. It demonstrates how a right can shift under the Constitution 
from unprotected to protected without requiring a paradigmatic shift in the way the 
Constitution is read. It argues that, similar to previous civil-rights cases, same-sex 
marriage is now protected by the Constitution, and those courts that found no rational 








Folk Devils and Moral History 
 
Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral 
panic. A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to 
become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is 
presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the 
moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other 
right thinking people… 
 
- Stanley Cohen1 
 
 Few subjects have caused an uproar or caught the imagination of moral majorities 
more than sex. From St. Augustine of Hippo who came to see lust as “the most dangerous 
of all human drives,”2 to the U.S. government’s “purge of the perverts” in the 1950s, 
which commenced with Deputy Undersecretary John Peurifoy “reveal[ing] that a number 
of persons considered to be security risks had been forced out [of government positions], 
and that among these were ninety-one homosexuals,” 3 the fear of sexual deviance has 
been a motivating force through much of history. 
 The most vociferous moral advocates over the last sixty years have often been 
concerned with the “homosexual agenda.”4 Slowly, the LGBT community has been able 
                                                
1 Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2002), 1. Stanley Cohen’s 
research into moral panics was concerned more with the impact of media-created moral panics in regards to 
“rebellious youth,” but his work has salience here, especially as it relates to the “moral barricades.” 
2 Faramerz Dabhoiwala, The Origins of Sex, (Oxford University Press, 2012), 8. 
3 David K. Johnson, The Lavender Scare: The Cold War Persecution of Gays and Lesbians in the Federal 
Government, (The University of Chicago Press, 2004), introduction, para. 3, kindle edition. 
4 See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (Scalia, dissenting.) (“Today’s opinion is the 
product of a Court, which is the product of a law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to the so-
called homosexual agenda, by which I mean the agenda promoted by some homosexual activists directed at 
eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct.”) 
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to pry civil liberties from the clenched fist of society, and most recently progress has been 
in the area of same-sex marriage. Opponents of same-sex marriage deliver ominous  
warnings of tragedies – a “parade of horribles”5 – that may befall society if same-sex 
marriage is permitted, or in some cases permitted to continue. 
 Historically civil rights have not been granted easily, and this can often be 
attributed to this paper’s namesake. “Passions and prejudices,”6 will often inform the 
obstinate will of majorities in place of reason, to the detriment of equality. To be sure, 
passions and prejudices were constantly referenced throughout founding era documents, 
including many of The Federalist Papers. It was a fear that where reason was absent, 
government would be guided by more emotive impulses.  
 Debate over the right for women to vote brought threats that it would lead to 
higher crime and higher rates of divorce;7 debate over desegregation brought threats that 
“irreparable harm will be inflicted upon the students of both the Negro and white race;”8 
in the debates over interracial marriage the state argued that the very institution of 
marriage was at stake, and because the family is the building block of civilization it could 
lead to the disintegration of society;9 debates over gay rights have brought similar fears 
despite evidence to the contrary. 
 This paper addresses the Constitution’s role in civil-rights cases, and in particular, 
why its Fourteenth Amendment now defends same-sex marriage, even if this has yet to 
                                                
5 Brief for Appellees at 92, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16751, October 18, 2010. 
6 Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist Papers: No. 1,” The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History, and 
Diplomacy, last modified 2008, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed01.asp 
7 J.B. Sanford, “Reasons Why Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 8 Should Not be Adopted,” vol. 11 of 
The California Outlook: A Progressive Weekly,” (September 16, 1911), www.books.google.com. 
8 “COOPER v. AARON,” The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, accessed November 21, 
2012, http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1958/1958_1. 
9 “LOVING v. VIRGINIA,” The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, accessed October 5, 
2012, http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1966/1966_395. 
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be recognized in all fifty states or the Supreme Court. This paper aims to show that while 
in some cases there may be legitimate criticism about the Supreme Court’s fidelity to the 
Constitution, civil rights cases like Brown v. Board of Education, which desegregated 
schools; Loving v. Virginia, which struck down anti-miscegenation laws; Reed v. Reed, 
which said women are constitutionally equal to men; and now the case of same-sex 
marriage, do not violate the Constitution but rather are inevitable consequences of a static 
document being applied to a polity over a long period of time.  
 Segregation was permitted until 1954 when the Supreme Court ruled that it had 
become unconstitutional. States were permitted to prohibit interracial marriage until 
1967, when it suddenly became unconstitutional. Until 1971 gender was not covered by 
the Equal Protection Clause – discriminating against women in state laws was 
constitutionally permissible. Then in Reed v. Reed, a state law that “provide[d] [] 
different treatment be accorded to the applicants on the basis of their sex” was struck 
down as the “very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”10 More recently, laws that discriminate against 
homosexuals have been struck down in Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas.  
 Strong disagreement pervades the literature regarding the proper role of the 
judiciary. Much of it is spent analyzing whether or not civil-rights decisions, like Brown 
v. Board of Education, were correctly adjudicated. Regardless of whether a scholar 
agrees with the conclusion, some argue that it was inappropriate for the judiciary to step 
                                                
10 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
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in, and by doing so they usurped the power of the legislatures, i.e. the people. Some who 
take this view argue that a legitimate case can be made for Brown, but it just wasn’t.11  
 This paper serves two purposes. It answers how something like segregation can 
go from being permitted to being prohibited when the same text is applied to the same 
situation, and further that like segregation, interracial marriage, and the equal treatment 
of women, same-sex marriage is a question of equal protection and is indeed covered by 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.  
 As one of the more recent victims of being labeled deviant by a moral majority, 
the gay community has come under fire in a way that demonstrates the salience of 
sociologist Stanley Cohen’s work. According to Cohen, those engaged in a moral panic 
will identify a group, called folk devils, as deviant: 
 
The deviant is assigned to a role or social type, shared perspectives develop 
through which he and his behaviour are visualized and explained, motives are 
imputed, causal patterns are searched for and the behavior is grouped with other 
behaviour thought to be of the same order.12 
 
 Of the same order is dangerous territory. When panic ensues that order is often 
exaggerated or even utterly unrelated. In 1950, during the Red Scare, “three of President 
Harry Truman’s top advisors wrote him a joint memorandum warning that ‘the country is 
more concerned about the charges of homosexuals in Government than about 
Communists.’”13 Civil-rights struggles are often difficult because they become politicized 
and politicians create a vicious cycle. Irrational fears are exacerbated by political rhetoric, 
                                                
11 See McConnell, “Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions,” (1995); see also Burt, “What Was 
Wrong with Dred Scott, What’s Right about Brown,” (1985). 
12 Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, 57. 
13 Johnson, The Lavender Scare, 2. 
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and political rhetoric is fueled by a desire to impress constituents about how tough they 
are on society’s irrational fears.  
 Indeed, the gay community has had to deal with accusations of being deviant and 
therefore likely to commit a cadre of actions associated with deviance. Unlike skin color 
or gender, homosexuality has had the unique fight of whether it is a choice or not, and 
this has stifled its struggle for civil rights. Homosexuals have had to deal with their own 
identity in a civilization that stigmatizes and marginalizes them, while society’s recent 
treatment has often ranged from abuse to perplexity. The discreet nature of 
homosexuality leads to the kind of misunderstanding that led columnist Robert C. Ruark 
to suggest, “it is possible to face the problem of homosexuality and perversion with the 
same honesty it took us so long to win the case of venereal disease.”14 Of course, unlike 
VD, homosexuality cannot be “cured,” and certainly not with antibiotics. 
 Same-sex marriage has been deemed the “last civil rights battle,” and while equal 
protection appears prima facie to treat same-sex couples in an equal manner to different-
sex couples, this is not currently the case. Broadly speaking, the issue of same-sex 
marriage must contend with two arguments in the U.S. legal system: (1) it is not a 
constitutional matter and therefore should be left to the state legislatures to decide, and 
(2) it poses some threat to society. The first argument is contingent on how the 
Constitution is interpreted, whereas the second argument is contingent on the ability of 
opponents to articulate a hypothetical harm caused by the marriage of same-sex couples. 
 The larger portion of this paper focuses little on the specific issue of same-sex 
marriage, and more on the question of how something becomes constitutionally 
                                                
14 Ibid., 6. 
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protected. The first argument concerns the theory behind constitutional law and 
interpretation and is inherently a more complex subject than defining harm. The second 
argument and same-sex marriage are therefore not specifically addressed until the last 
two chapters.  
 Importantly, this paper’s approach is a minimal one. There are countless 
arguments, political, legal, and of course philosophical in regards to same-sex marriage 
and separately the Constitution. There are some salient points to be made in regards to 
constitutional interpretation, the justification for state coercion, and morality that this 
paper does not cover. Its thesis is one that does not need to go beyond a minimal level of 
analysis. That is, this paper concedes a great deal more than might be necessary to make 
the same point. It does so chiefly to maintain boundaries, but secondly because it can; as 
this paper intends to demonstrate, for the most conservative and restrained scholar of 
constitutional law to invoke a method of exegesis consistently would require the 
inclusion of sexual orientation and subsequently same-sex marriage under the Equal 
Protection Clause.  
 As with most civil-rights cases, hidebound majorities will often grasp at straws 
leaving defenders of civil rights debating what would otherwise be considered inane or 
irrelevant arguments. Because this paper addresses same-sex marriage, it is important to 
establish some facts about homosexuality and marriage lest a reader enter this discussion 







 Some proponents of same-sex marriage will argue that whether sexual orientation 
is or is not a choice shouldn’t have bearing on the issue, as people should be able to live 
their lives as they please. There are some very cogent arguments to this point, however, it 
ignores the reality of both the political implications and the rights being proscribed. The 
difference between acts and orientation is the difference between a behavior and an 
immutable characteristic completely inseparable from the individual. This will be 
addressed more specifically later, but for now consider this: the Equal Protection Clause 
– which is what this paper’s argument turns on – forbids a state from denying equal 
protection to “person[s].” Any choice is not inextricably part and parcel of that person; 
orientation is a defining characteristic of a person. The question it seems is whether that 
trait exposes society to harm. 
 It is true that any person can engage in homosexual activity, but the activity does 
not imply orientation. In regards to sexual orientation, (i.e. erotic attractions and sexual 
arousal oriented to one sex or the other, or both),15 this paper will strictly adhere to what 
the evidence shows: that it is in fact an immutable characteristic inseparable from the 
person. Whatever a person’s orientation might be, and it does not always come in 
absolutes, it is defining and without the possibility of change. Attempts at change are 
continually denounced as harmful and the claims of supposed reparative therapies have 
been said to “mischaracterize homosexuality and promote the notion that sexual 
                                                
15 B.S. Anton, “Proceedings of the American Psychological Association for the legislative year 2009: 
Minutes of the annual meeting of the Council of Representatives and minutes of the meetings of the Board 
of Directors,” American Psychologist, 65, 385–475, (2010) doi:10.1037/a0019553 
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orientation can be changed.”16 The American Psychological Association observed some 
unfortunate effects of attempting to change orientation: 
 
Distress and depression were exacerbated. Belief in the hope of sexual 
orientation change followed by the failure of the treatment was identified as a 
significant cause of distress and negative self-image.17 
 
Although it is not the place of this paper to get involved in the essentialist versus social 
constructionist debate,18 current research seems to favor the essentialist school of 
thought. A 2010 paper in Pediatric Neuroendocrinology stated: 
 
The fetal brain develops during the intrauterine period in the male direction 
through a direct action of testosterone on the developing nerve cells, or in the 
female direction through the absence of this hormone surge. In this way, our 
gender identity (the conviction of belonging to the male or female gender) and 
sexual orientation are programmed or organized into our brain structures when 
we are still in the womb. However, since sexual differentiation of the genitals 
takes place in the first two months of pregnancy and sexual differentiation of the 
brain starts in the second half of pregnancy, these two processes can be 
influenced independently, which may result in extreme cases in transsexuality. 
This also means that in the event of ambiguous sex at birth, the degree of 
masculinization of the genitals may not reflect the degree of masculinization of 
the brain. There is no indication that social environment after birth has an effect 
on gender identity or sexual orientation.19 
 
While this paper favors the essentialist view, it does not dismiss the importance of social 
construction. Indeed, it has been established that the delineation between heterosexual 
and homosexual was drawn around the early eighteenth century, when the heterosexual 
                                                
16 Ibid., at 29. 
17 Ibid., at 30. 
18 The essentialist school of thought posits that sexual orientation is inborn, while the social constructionist 
school of thought posits that orientation is a construct of society and culture. For a more thorough 
discussion see Phillips, “Constructing Definitions of Sexual Orientation in Research Theory,” (2007). 
19 Alicia Garcia-Falgueras and Dick F. Swaab, “Sexual Hormones and the Brain: An Essential Alliance for 
Sexual Identity and Sexual Orientation,” ed. P.-E. Mullis, Pediatric Neuroendocrinology 17 (2010): 22-35. 
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and the homosexual emerged because of changing social constructs.20 As philosopher and 
social constructionist Michael Focault noted, “[t]he sodomite had been a temporary 
aberration; the homosexual was now a species.”21 “The more clearly the line was drawn, 
[between acceptable and deviant behavior,] the more emphatically the homosexual or any 
other subculture [that] was labeled different and distinct, the more likely it was that such 
a subculture would develop a group consciousness, a sense of its own separateness and 
identity.”22 Regardless of the school of thought to which a person subscribes, it should be 
noted that both acknowledge the immutable aspect of sexual orientation.23  
 If sexual orientation is indeed beyond modification, this would logically coalesce 
with a 1996 University of Georgia study that found “[h]omophobia is apparently 
associated with homosexual arousal that the homophobic individual is either unaware of 
or denies.”24 It would seem that if orientation is beyond conscious control, that a person 
who strongly believes that their own orientation has been a choice might in fact be 
choosing heterosexual behavior in spite of a more homosexually inclined orientation. 
Again, this does not mean there are only absolutes in regards to sexual orientation, but 
that whatever an individual’s orientation is, it is immutable. This is the position from 
which this paper will work. 
 
  
                                                
20 Randolph Trumbach, Sex and the Gender Revolution Vol. 1: Heterosexuality and the Third Gender in 
Enlightenment London, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 4. 
21 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol 1: An Introduction, tr. Robert Hurley (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1980), 43. 
22 Nicholas C. Edsall, Toward Stonewall: Homosexuality and Society in the Modern Western World, 
(Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2003), 69. 
23 JW Smitt, “Homosexuality in a new light,” International Journal of Sexology 6 (1952): 36–39. 
24 Henry E. Adams, Lester W. Wright, Jr., and Bethany A. Lohr, “Is Homophobia Associated With 




 Throughout human history, from the most primitive humanoid societies to present 
day, homosexuality has been part of human existence.25 Various cultures have 
historically treated it differently. Stories from the Zhou dynasty and Ming dynasty 
include many same-sex marriages and relationships.26 The ancient Egyptians used to 
practice same-sex marriage,27 and from the Babylonians28 to the Greco-Roman era,29 
same-sex relationships flourished.  
 Marriage as an institution has undergone significant changes; it has not always 
concerned itself with the church or the state. Indeed, “[i]n considering whether marriage 
has a fixed essence or definition, the historical and cross-cultural diversity of marital 
practices cannot be overstated.”30 For the Greek philosophers marriage was “a political 
and economic unit,”31 and it was the Christian philosophers who introduced a “stern 
sexual morality,”32 which stressed an “ascetic ideal of abstinence.”33  
                                                
25 See Ryan and Jethá, Sex at Dawn (2010). See also Niell, The Origins and Role of Same-Sex Relations in 
Human Societies (2009). See also Boswell, Christianity, Tolerance, and Homosexuality (1981). See also 
Eskridge, Jr., “A History of Same-Sex Marriage” in Vir. L. Rev. (1993). 
26 James Neill, The Origins and Role of Same-Sex Relations in Human Societies, (Jefferson, NC: 
McFarland & Company, Inc., 2009), chapter 10, Kindle edition. 
27 William N. Eskridge, Jr., “A History of Same-Sex Marriage,” Virginia Law Review 79 (1993): 1419. 
(“The implication that same-sex intimacy was common in Egypt (and Canaan) is confirmed by the Sifra, an 
exegetic midrash interpreting the book of Leviticus.” The Sifra explains that one reason the Israelites were 
prohibited from acting as they do in Egypt is “A man would marry a man, and a woman would marry a 
woman, a man would marry a woman and her daughter, a woman would be married to two men.”) 
28 Neill, The Origins and Role of Same-Sex Relations in Human Societies., chapter 4, Kindle edition. 
29 Elizabeth Brake, Minimizing Marriage, introduction. 
30 Elizabeth Brake, Minimizing Marriage: Marriage, Morality, and the Law, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), introduction, Kindle edition. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Dabhoiwala, The Origins of Sex, 7. 
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 The Christian tradition altered the view of sex, which had been more liberal under 
previous Jewish law,34 into something corrupting as it “seduced one’s mind and body 
away from its highest purpose of communing with God.”35 Sex became something that 
was to be avoided, but “if [people] cannot contain [their lusts], let them marry: for it is 
better to marry than to burn.’”36 One of the most influential philosophers on Christian 
ideals of sex was St. Augustine (354 - 430 AD) who propounded this ideal of chastity and 
“condemn[ed] [] sex outside of marriage and lust within it.”37 
 After Christianity became the official religion of the Roman empire, under 
emperor Theodosius, church officials became more intertwined with the state, taking on 
“more quasi-governmental functions.”38 When Rome collapsed “the pope headed one of 
the few institutions able to raise money, administer law, preserve records,”39 and so on. 
Eventually, “the church’s evolving political role and economic power were to embroil it 
deeply in the politics of marriage, divorce, and family life in the new kingdoms of 
Western Europe.”40 
 Until the twelfth century the church required sexual intercourse to seal a marriage. 
Then bishop Peter Lombard of Paris pointed out that if this were the case, “Mary and 
Joseph could not have been legally married.” The validity of marriage no longer required 
sex.41 As the church’s influence spread, it was gathering a greater diversity of adherents, 
many of whom had entered into marriages informally. Initially the church recognized 
                                                
34 Ibid., 6. 
35 Ibid., 7. 
36 Ibid., (quoting Paul the Apostle). 
37 Brake, Minimizing Marriage, introduction. 
38 Stephanie Coontz, Marriage, a History, (New York: Viking Penguin, 2005), chapter 5, iBook edition. 
39 Ibid., chapter 5. 
40 Ibid., chapter 5. 
41 Ibid., chapter 7. 
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these informal marriages and required no more than “mutual intent or the blessing of a 
parent…to solemnize a marriage.”42 Christianity did not require an official of the church 
to preside over marriage until 1215, when the church decided that it “did not like being 
put in the awkward position of defending young couples who, by privately exchanging 
their vows, married in defiance of their parents’ wishes.”43 In response to this problem, 
 
[T]he Fourth Lateran Council declared in 1215 that “we absolutely prohibit 
clandestine marriages.” For a marriage to be valid, the council stated, three things 
were necessary: The bride had to have a dowry, which effectively undercut the 
independence of a young woman from her parents; banns had to be published 
beforehand; and the wedding had to take place in a church.44 
 
 Clandestine marriages slowed but never ceased entirely and to further combat 
this, England passed the Marriage Act of 1753.45 On the shores of the United States, the 
colonies did not always have the resources to deal with the idea of civil marriage, and so 
“although laws concerning marriage existed, informal or ‘self-marriage’ and self-divorce 
(without official authorization), sometimes followed by remarriage, were widespread.”46 
 What “traditionalists”47 call marriage, and what they try to protect, is a relatively 
new institution. The more specific the description gets – e.g. with love, not for property, 
monogamous, consensual, and so on – the newer and more innovative the definition 
becomes. There were certainly exceptions, including those who fell in love, but regarding 
normative standards, the contemporary traditionalist’s conception is novel. Even in 
regards to monogamy the long-arc of history shows that “polygyny, not monogamy, has 
                                                
42 Ibid., chapter 7. 
43 Ibid., chapter 7. 
44 Ibid., chapter 6. 
45 Ibid., chapter 7. 
46 Brake, Minimizing Marriage, introduction. 
47 See generally Wax, “Traditionalism, Pluralism, and Same-Sex Marriage,” (2007); See also Wax, “The 
Conservative’s Dilemma: Traditional Institutions, Social Change, and Same-Sex Marriage,” (2005). 
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been dominant—and has existed within the Judeo-Christian tradition, a fact for which 
both Augustine and Aquinas apologize.”48 
 Indeed, what many consider defining aspects of marriage are contingent on time 
and place. There are many examples of societies that flourished without heteronormative 
exclusivity in marriage, but the newness to culture in the United States produces 
something akin to moral panics. Considering marriage in the United States, it seems the 
conditions relevant to the state that must be satisfied to merit a legal recognition of 
marriage are minimal.  
 This work is divided into two parts. Part I consists of Chapters One – Three, 
which address constitutional theory. Part II consists of chapters Four – Six, which 
addresses the history and application of the provisions relevant to this matter. In 
addressing the exegetic process, Part I is imperative to understanding Part II, because it 
illuminates why changes in knowledge produce inevitable changes within the 
Constitution. This is not a matter of simply moral changes or changes in opinion, but 
rather how changes in knowledge produce changes in fact.  
 Chapter One answers the question of why in a democracy people would vest in 
“electorally unaccountable justices”49 the power to overturn democratically adopted 
legislation. This chapter establishes a point that will be revisited throughout the paper: 
while our government derives its authority from the consent of the governed, the reason it 
is not a direct democracy is because of the fear that an irrational majority may tyrannize a 
                                                
48 Brake, Minimizing Marriage, introduction. 
49 See infra note 86. 
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minority. It addresses what Alexander Bickel termed the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty,50 which was not foreign to those who ratified the Constitution. 
 Chapter Two will address constitutional exegesis – both methods and problems 
inherent with those methods. Same-sex marriage must contend with methods lauded by 
more conservative justices and constitutional law scholars. These methods claim it never 
was covered by the Constitution and therefore it cannot legitimately be covered without 
the people’s consent on the specific issue. These methods contend that to do otherwise is 
to usurp the power of the people, placing it into the unaccountable hands of the judiciary. 
Because justices tend to use an amalgam of the methods discussed, the chapter will 
principally focus on the problem of reading the Constitution with a eighteenth or 
nineteenth century mindset. 
 Chapter Three will discuss why the provisions of any written document that is 
designed to remain relevant over a long period of time will necessarily incur change. It 
will consider how the provisions within a text can maintain fixed meanings while the 
objects they refer to change.  
 Chapter Four begins Part II, which looks at the construction and history of the 
Equal Protection Clause. This section is of particular importance because it also 
demonstrates the lack of rationale with which passionate majorities inimical to the rights 
of minorities will pursue their ends. When reason succumbs to passion and prejudice, 
opponents of civil rights will look for every loophole, make every claim that they can 
find, and even when faced with the most explicit pronouncements against their wishes, 
admittedly defy the Constitution, and compel the Supreme Court to act. 
                                                
50 Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, 2nd ed. (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1962). 
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 Chapter Five sets the stage for the arguments explored in Chapter Six. The 
question of what conditions an argument must satisfy to warrant a rational basis for the 
unequal treatment of persons is answered here. Civil-rights cases are often subjected to a 
wide range of arguments, some of which have no conceivable footing in reality. 
Consequently, this chapter starts by establishing that, as a product of the Enlightenment, 
the United States was founded on the emphatic employment of reason in lieu of more 
impassioned impulses.  
 Chapter Six engages those arguments which opponents to same-sex marriage 
invoke. With a full understanding of the Equal Protection Clause and the rational-basis 
test, it should become clear that the arguments leveled at same-sex marriage do not create 
a rational basis rooted in either logic or history. This chapter uses the Proposition 8 same-
sex marriage case from California, to build a framework of arguments and fleshes them 
out with those posited by Professor Amy Wax, the Robert Mundheim Professor of Law at 
University of Pennsylvania Law School. This work then concludes by combining all 








The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty 
 
It may sound oddly to say that the majority is a faction; but it is, 
nevertheless, literally just. If the majority is partial in their own favor, if 
they refuse or deny a perfect equality to every member of the minority, 
they are a faction; and as a popular assembly, collective or 
representative, cannot act, or will, but by a vote, the first step they take, if 
they are not unanimous, occasions a division into majority and minority, 
that is, into two parties, and the moment the former is unjust it is a faction. 
 
-John Adams 
March 22, 177851 
 
Democracy is two wolves and a lamb voting on what to have for dinner. 
- Unknown52 
 
 “This Court has no business imposing upon all Americans the resolution favored 
by the elite class from which the Members of this institution are selected, pronouncing 
that ‘animosity’ toward homosexuality is evil. I vigorously dissent.”53 Justice Antonin 
Scalia was once again castigating his fellow justices for purportedly usurping the power 
of the people to the detriment of the Constitution. In Colorado a statewide referendum 
had passed which “preclude[d] all legislative, executive, or judicial action at any level of 
state or local government designed to protect the status of persons based on their 
‘homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships.’”54 It 
was a unique law in that its purpose was to prevent other laws that might be passed to 
                                                
51 John Adams and Charles Francis Adams, The works of John Adams, Second President of the United 
States: with a life of the author, notes and illustrations, Vol. VI. (Boston: Charles C. Little And James 
Brown, 1851), 60. 
52 Frequently misattributed to Benjamin Franklin. Also attributed to James Bovard of the Sacramento Bee. 
53 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). (Scalia, dissenting.) 
54 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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protect the gay community. The Supreme Court found that such a law was remarkably at 
odds with the Constitution and struck it down. Scalia believed otherwise.  
 This interplay between the will of democratic majorities and the court’s 
obligation, to uphold constitutionally protected individual rights, is emblematic of what 
Alexander Bickel termed the counter-majoritarian difficulty. It has become acutely part 
of our constitutional government. In western liberal democracies, what is considered 
legitimate power is derived from the consent of the governed; on the other hand, tyranny 
of the majority is a real problem of which the framers of the Constitution were well 
aware. It is a problem that has beleaguered our constitutional democracy since its 
inception and there is still an impassioned debate as to the best way to answer it.  
 Constitutional scholars who give the most deference to authority and individual 
states, will perceive the court’s role as minimal and to some extent indifferent to 
individual rights. Some have argued that because the framers included “those rights a 
tyrannical government had traditionally moved against,” and left out other rights, that 
“they don’t care” about personal rights.55 This view will often manifest itself in states’-
rights arguments: if a majority within a state adopts legislation, it is up to that state to 
repeal it, and not the business of the federal judiciary to step in. This is the base-level 
argument that allows a person to believe that states infringing on personal rights do not 
raise constitutional questions. 
 Contrary to this are the scholars who give deference to the individual over 
government. They will point out that while states’-rights are important, to defer to the 
states at the expense of the individual, is to miss the reason that there was a debate over 
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the relationship of the state and federal government in the first place; indeed, the Anti-
Federalists argued that local, state control was a better guard of individual rights. The 
Federalists disagreed, and it was the Federalists’ constitution that was adopted. One tool 
established to ensure those rights in the Constitution are protected from majorities acting 
through government was judicial review. 
 The act of judicial review is the “proper and peculiar province of the courts,”56 
but its nature has long been a cause of trepidation. In a letter to Thomas Jefferson, James 
Madison expressed his misgivings about “the Judiciary [being] paramount... to the 
Legislature.”57 He stated that this was never meant to be and “can never be proper.”58 It is 
a precarious device, because at once it theoretically allows protection of minority groups 
from the “tyranny of the legislatures,”59 while at the same time giving the only unelected 
branch of government a power that is supposed to be retained by the people.  
 While Madison wrestled with the idea himself, he seemed to reconcile the issue 
just enough to publicly support it – at least around the time of ratification. He declared 
that the Constitution as fundamental law was antecedent to all other laws: “A law 
violating a constitution established by the people...would be considered by the Judges 
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null & void.”60 On June 8, 1789 while arguing for a Bill of Rights, he referred to the 
courts as “independent tribunals of justice” and justices as the “guardians of…rights.”61 
 Any extant reservations gave way to practical necessity and congress passed the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, which explicitly demarcated the judicial supremacy of the 
Supreme Court. Hamilton seemed less conflicted as he had argued for its purpose in 
Federalist Paper, No. 78. “It is urged” he said, “that the authority which can declare the 
acts of another void, must necessarily be superior to the one whose acts may be declared 
void.”62 It cannot be a “natural presumption” that the legislature is to police itself. “It is 
far more rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body 
between the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter 
within the limits assigned to their authority.”63 He continued, casting aside any doubt as 
to who should determine the meaning of provisions in question, “…A constitution is, in 
fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to 
them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding 
from the legislative body.”64 Hamilton argued that of the three branches of government, 
the judiciary was the “least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution.”65 
Finally, it was codified within the American legal system in Marbury v. Madison, when 
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Chief Justice Marshall wrote, “…It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.”66  
 Judicial review necessarily changes the relationship between the courts and the 
legislatures. In regards to where the line in the sand must be drawn between majority rule 
and individual rights, Alexander Bickel asked, 
 
Which values…qualify as sufficiently important or fundamental or whathaveyou 
to be vindicated by the Court against other values affirmed by legislative acts? 
And how is the Court to evolve and apply them?67 
 
 Whatever values may or may not warrant court intervention, the bottom line is 
that “From the beginning…the language of America has been the language of rights.”68 
To what degree may be up for debate, but in recent decades something of a cynical 
backlash has emerged because of this almost uniquely American emphasis on rights. 
Indeed, “…So great has the preoccupation with rights become that it has given rise to a 
phenomenon that has itself become a topic of interest, rights talk.”69 Talk of rights has 
become a subject of reproach, prompting one critic to refer to it as “shrill, anti-social, 
irresponsible, and reductionist;”70 subsequently, a plea for rights is often dismissed. 
Irrespective of any cynicism, the significance that the original ratifiers placed on 
individual rights led to an emphasis on protection from majority factions within states.71 
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This context directly affected the debates over ratification and the manner in which the 
Constitution was organized and realized. The implications were material and permanent.  
 This emphasis on personal rights came about in part due to a concern over 
property rights, and ironically in part as a reaction to the threat religion posed on 
individual rights.72 If religion was able to touch any part of legislative acts, they knew 
from experience that oppression would soon follow. It was a fight over a religious 
assessment bill in Virginia that gave Madison and Jefferson a concerning insight into the 
greater threat of a republican government – the state legislatures. They knew the danger 
that religious passion could impose on private rights so that, 
 
In the realm of religion…what Madison and Jefferson contested was the capacity 
of the state to act at all. And they did so not on behalf of the collective right of a 
people to be free from arbitrary rule, but rather to protect autonomous individuals 
as the bearer of rights.73 
 
 The threat of factions became a major focus. The experience Madison earned 
caused him to ponder “why, in a republic” a legislature might wield power arbitrarily and 
become more dangerous to personal rights than an executive.74 He came to the conclusion 
that because legislators kowtow “to the passions and interest of their constituents” the 
biggest challenge would not be to protect individuals “from government,” but rather “to 
defend minorities and individuals against popular majorities acting through 
government.”75 
 Further, Madison realized that it was less likely (although not impossible) that 
these kinds of factions would hinder rights at the federal level. Instead, “the true problem 
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of protecting rights was to curb injustice within the individual states, where most laws 
affecting property and religion (and all other ordinary activities) would still originate.”76 
In his pre-convention memorandum, he considers the problem of democratic majority 
rule: 
 
If the multiplicity and mutability of laws prove want of wisdom, their injustice 
betrays a defect still more alarming: more alarming not merely because it is a 
greater evil in itself, but because it brings more into question the fundamental 
principle of republican Government, that the majority who rule in such 
governments are the safest Guardians both of public good and of private rights.77 
 
That is, he sees it as a defect of republican government that majority rule should be 
considered the “safest guardian” of private rights.  
 It should be noted that while Madison was the architect of the Constitution, it was 
ultimately ratified by the states, some of whose signatures were contingent on the 
inclusion of a Bill of Rights. There were indeed Anti-Federalists who were wary of 
strong national control. This argument however, if followed to its conclusion, only serves 
to bolster the individual-rights point. The Anti-Federalists were largely concerned with 
the national government violating “personal rights.”78  
 Even the future disagreements that Jefferson and Madison came to have over the 
power of the judiciary were due to the encroachment on individual rights. As Charles 
Black writes, 
 
It is true that Madison, with Jefferson, came to have deep disagreements with 
some actions of the federal judiciary, particularly in the case of the Circuit Judges 
who upheld the Alien and Sedition Acts but that disagreement was based on 
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those judges’ not being vigorous enough in protecting human rights by the 
judicial power. Jefferson was dissatisfied, in that controversy, with the federal 
judges’ not having been sufficiently “activist,” not “anti-majoritarian” enough. 
(The Alien and Sedition law was after all, an Act of Congress, the nearest thing 
to a national majority.)79 
 
To be sure, liberty and the avoidance of arbitrary rule, and safety against those working 
through government were paramount concerns inculcated into the Constitution; it 
pervaded the entire political spectrum in revolutionary America, and was further 
amplified during reconstruction.  
 Shortly after the Civil War it became clear that passionate majorities working 
through government, at the state level, would not be quelled easily. As a result, the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, and subsequent reconstruction amendments emphasized the Union 
over the individual states. Southern states relied on the states’-rights argument, which 
was a decidedly more compelling argument prior to the Civil War. Indeed, “…Opponents 
of the Civil Rights Act charged that it violated the Tenth Amendment, which ‘reserved to 
the states’ those powers not granted to Congress…. Even [the bill’s] advocates 
recognized the bill’s replacement of state with federal authority.”80 Senator Lot Morrill of 
Maine plainly stated, 
 
No nation, from the foundation of government, has ever undertaken to make a 
legislative declaration so broad. Why? Because no nation hitherto has ever 
cherished a liberty so universal. The ancient republics were all exceptional in 
their liberty; they all had excepted classes, subjected classes, which were not the 
subject of government, and, therefore, they could not so legislate. That it is 
extraordinary and without a parallel in the history of this Government, or of any 
other, does not affect the character of the declaration itself. The Senator from 
Kentucky tells us that the proposition is revolutionary, and he thinks that is an 
objection. I freely concede that it is revolutionary. I admit, that this species of 
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legislation is absolutely revolutionary. But are we not in the midst of a 
revolution? Is the Senator from Kentucky utterly oblivious to the grand results of 
four years of war? Are we not in the midst of a civil and political revolution 
which has changed the fundamental principles of our Government in some 
respects?81 
 
 While an awareness of the counter-majoritarian difficulty helps to understand that 
the Constitution was made with an eye to autonomy, and why the judiciary might 
sometimes be called on, there is still a debate over at what level of detail provisions 
should be abstracted. With the power to declare acts of legislatures void, courts are wary 
of misappropriating constitutionally mandated powers. Theories range from a specific 
application, to an acute adherence to precedent, to a living interpretation rooted in a 
particular justice’s moral inclinations. Although the text is static, the vague nature of the 
provisions allow for this wide range of methods. To solve the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty, the next chapter discusses the ambitious business of interpreting a written 
constitution.  
                                                
81 William H. Barnes, A.M., History of the Thirty-Ninth Congress of the United States, (New York, NY: 





In Pursuit of Judicial Restraint 
 
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of 
which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may 
be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, 
and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind…. Its nature, 
therefore, requires that only its great outlines should be marked, its 
important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose 
those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves. 
 
- Chief Justice John Marshall 
181982 
 
 If the counter-majoritarian difficulty poses the question, where is the line drawn 
between majority rule and individual rights? Constitutional interpretation offers the 
answer. Unfortunately, the answer is not as cut-and-dried as one might hope. Peter Irons 
suggests that the Supreme Court is “a political institution, and constitutional litigation [is] 
a form of politics.”83 He emphasizes this point with an observation made by Tocqueville: 
“…Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved sooner 
or later, into a judicial question.”84 The nature of the Constitution and its construction 
subject it fairly easily to the moral ideals that a justice may want to read into it, and this 
has caused some consternation for a few justices and scholars. Professor Gordon Wood 
notes, 
 
There was not in 1787–1788—and today there is still not—one “correct” or 
“true” meaning of the Constitution. The Constitution means whatever we want it 
to mean. Of course, we cannot attribute any meaning we want and expect to get 
away with it. We have to convince others of our “true” interpretation, and if we 
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can convince enough people that that is the “true” interpretation, then so it 
becomes. That is how the culture changes.85 
 
 It seems this almost-cynical view of the Constitution is not a rare one. In 
criticizing an interpretive method that he did not agree with, Justice Brennan made the 
point that “the political underpinnings of such a choice should not escape notice.”86 After 
studying the subject for some time, Professor Mark Tushnet’s perspective went through a 
rather dramatic change: “I no longer believe that constitutional theory constrains, or is 
supposed to constrain judges. Rather…it serves primarily to provide a set of rhetorical 
devices that judges can deploy as they believe effective.”87  
 As a result, many justices and legal scholars fear that too many courts are 
replacing what the law is with their own moral idea of what the law ought to be.88 The 
nature of “general propositions”89 laid out in the Constitution make this a palpable risk. 
There is virtue in applying the law as it is known, as opposed to justices imbedding their 
own personal convictions. Often referred to as judicial restraint, it is argued that this 
most aptly occurs by the courts showing deference to the legislatures.90 Contrary to this is 
judicial activism, which has taken on a pejorative tint; it implies that a justice has ignored 
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the dictates of the Constitution and predicated their judgment on no more than their own 
flighty discretion.  
 To be sure, restraint is important in maintaining a sense of legitimacy, but also 
important is the court’s role in preventing a tyrannical majority from violating the 
constitutional rights of a minority. The Supreme Court has acknowledged this point on 
multiple occasions.91 If legislation conflicts with the Constitution, it becomes a federal 
issue. In 1803 Chief Justice Marshall wrote that “[A] law repugnant to the Constitution is 
void, and [] courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.” He 
augmented the point, saying that if a state law which was repugnant to the Constitution 
were not held as such by the courts that “[the Constitution] is prescribing limits, and 
declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure.”92 Of course, in the interest of 
restraint, justices rightly remain cautious when reviewing legislation. 
 As it is relevant here, the question becomes, why does state prohibition of same-
sex marriage raise a constitutional question? If a theorist believes that it is not a 
constitutional question they will maintain that the state legislatures should determine the 
issue, but on the other hand, if a theorist believes it does raise a constitutional question 
they will believe it is a federal issue and that the Supreme Court has the final word. The 
debate over what the Constitution has to say about specific rights begins with 
interpretation, and this is immediately problematic. 
 This seemingly benign act can be stifled by subjective interests, and often 
subconsciously. In 1651, Thomas Hobbes observed of written law that “considering there 
be very few, perhaps none, that in some cases are not blinded by self-love, or some other 
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passion, it is now become of all Laws the most obscure and has consequently the greatest 
need of able interpreters.”93 The problem is further amplified by the manner in which the 
Constitution was crafted. 
 While the debates over the Constitution and its Bill of Rights were lengthy and 
enthusiastic, a desire to preserve the Union meant the focus was on “whether the 
Constitution would be adopted, not [on] formulat[ing] definitive interpretations of its 
individual clauses.”94 As a result, the Constitution with its Bill of Rights is largely a mix 
of specific pragmatic rules and vague idealistic principles. Elucidating what exactly this 
implies for constitutional controversies more than 220 years later has proved challenging.  
 Of the varied methods to interpret the Constitution, it is generally accepted that 
they all more or less maintain one of two characteristics: what many call either a living 
interpretation or a fixed interpretation. This, however, is something of a false dichotomy. 
Not only is it too simplistic for a lucid analyzation, it is in many ways misleading, as 
methods that are frequently referenced as fixed are just as living as their deeply criticized 
counterparts. 
 The method that a justice uses seems to be allied with how they conceive their 
role vis-à-vis the Constitution. This perceived role is largely dependent on where they 
believe the authority of a constitution arises, which in turn establishes their perception of 
the Constitution’s role “in defining and limiting the authority and powers of 
government.”95 There are essentially six models of how to interpret the Constitution, 96 
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but they can all more-or-less be distilled into three categories. For clarity, and what might 
be slightly more helpful to this analysis, Professor Robert Post’s model will be used. He 
separates the possibilities into, “‘Authority of Law,’ governed by doctrine… ‘Authority 
of Ethos,’ governed by morality… [and] ‘Authority of Consent,’ governed by history.”97 
 
I. Authority of Ethos 
 
 Those that believe the Constitution derives its authority from ideas of “dignity”98 
or “humanity,” essentially words suffused with moral inclinations, might be said to 
subscribe to an “Authority of Ethos.” They believe a constitution should be responsive to 
“current problems and current needs.”99 These interpretive methods “engage[] in an 
ongoing process of national self-definition.”100 This would be what people generally refer 
to as a living or evolving constitution. These theorists fear that using an interpretive 
method fixed too rigidly will needlessly submit the polity to detrimental, yet ostensibly 
avoidable outcomes; specifically, it is argued that politically vulnerable minorities will be 
at the mercy of a majority. 
 Society inevitably changes and, as the argument goes, adhering to anachronistic 
law can only serve to impede progress. Indeed, “[t]hose who would restrict claims of 
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right to the values of 1789… turn a blind eye to social progress and eschew adaption of 
overarching principles to changes of social circumstance.”101 
 Madison made the point that “in framing [the Constitution] which we wish to last 
for ages, we shd.[sic] not lose sight of the changes which ages will produce.”102 Those 
changes, it is agreed, are generally effected most faithfully through the legislatures, but 
ultimately court rulings have consequences today, and according to the moral interpreter, 
those consequences should not be ignored. The change in society requires justices to ask, 
“what do the words of the text mean in our time?”103 This evolving interpretive ethos can 
best be characterized by the majority opinion in 1958’s Trop v. Dulles: “the words of the 
[Eighth] Amendment are not precise, and [] their scope is not static. The Amendment 
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of 
a maturing society.”104 
 Those who claim to subscribe, (or are sometimes accused of subscribing), to an 
Authority of Ethos have often been on the liberal wing of the Supreme Court in recent 
decades. While some might enjoy the fruits of these rulings, the debate over those 
methods that allow for moral inclinations center on the idea that not everyone holds the 
same values. Justice Scalia, who emphatically claims not to be a moral reader, issues 
opinions that demonstrate quite the opposite. His conceptions of the Constitution’s 
establishment clause and the cruel and unusual punishment clause have been thoroughly 
dismantled, and exposed as moral “distortion[s] of the Constitution.”105  
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 The infamous Dred Scott v. Sanford case was decided by what the justices 
thought was best for society. The Supreme Court ruled that because the plaintiff was a 
slave, he did not have standing to sue in court. The declaration that the court did not have 
jurisdiction should have been the end of the case, but instead Chief Justice Taney went on 
to decide the second question of the case. He ruled that Congress did not have the power 
to prohibit slavery in territories and therefore Congress’s provision in the Missouri 
Compromise declaring it a free territory was unconstitutional. As Robert Burt noted, the 
ruling was fraught with “the most explicit racist dogma that appears anywhere, before or 
since his opinion.” Moral inclinations had infected the court’s judgment. Consequently, 
“of all the repudiated decisions, Dred Scott carries the deepest stigma,” and is the most 
“reviled.” 106 
 Moral decisions have of course come in a wide variety and are not always so 
disagreeable. The problem is that morals-based adjudication weakens any sense of 
legitimacy; it becomes a partisan tool for politics. Two similar cases might be decided 
differently based on no more than a justice’s personal feelings. Expressed by John Adams 
in the Constitution for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, stability and predictability 
in law allows a government to be one of “laws and not of men.” That is, it allows laws to 
apply evenly to individuals, irrespective of personal traits. 
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II. Authority of Law 
 
 Perhaps the most restrained a justice can be is by using the doctrine of precedent, 
or more formally, stare decisis. It is a vestige of the Common Law system whereby a law 
is expounded in one case and is forever a reference for future cases of similar 
circumstance. It gives the most deference to what has already been made law. Because it 
is self-referential, it has the unique characteristic of being imperative in avoiding 
arbitrary rule. Unlike adjudicating based on morals, it allows courts to apply the law in a 
predictable fashion establishing some sense of legitimacy. Citizens are able to reasonably 
plan their affairs and hence the legal framework maintains value.107 
 For this reason, questions of constitutional validity are usually decided by 
precedent rather than a scrutinizing look at the Constitution itself. After all, “…If the 
most powerful justification for the Constitution's authority is that it is law, and the most 
defensible justification for judicial review is that it is the peculiar province and duty of 
the courts to expound the law,”108 then once that law has been developed, the courts are 
required to follow it. Courts, in this sense, are able to keep discretion to a minimum and 
act as “mere instruments of the law.”109 It is generally the more controversial issues that 
have a lack of precedent to fall back on and require a fresh look at the Constitution.  
 Even when the law has seemingly been decided in one case, precedent is not 
foolproof and in fact can be problematic. Justices are human and humans are fallible, yet 
in subsequent cases, “the determination of similarity or difference is the function of each 
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judge.”110 That is, precedent is fundamentally analogical, rather than logical.111 Mistakes 
can be made and determining when a mistake has been made is not absolute. It can very 
well be a matter of contention between justices; consequently, justices are known to 
never be acutely bound by precedent.  
 To be sure, precedent is important, but imperfect. It allows for what might be 
deemed a correction in a previously held case, and it provides a bouquet of decisions 
from which to quote. As Justice Scalia points out, “…In the narrowest sense…the 
holding of a case cannot go beyond the facts that were before the court,” and when they 
want to, “courts will squint narrowly when they wish to avoid an earlier decision.”112 It 
can in this sense become just as flimsy as an interpretation based on a judge’s moral 
tendencies. 
 Of course, as with all human enterprises the legal system is developed through a 
continual process of learning through experience. Justice Brandeis observed the 
importance of precedent and its subservience to lessons learned in 1932: 
 
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more 
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right… 
This is commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious concern, 
provided correction can be had by legislation. But in cases involving the Federal 
Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically 
impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions. The Court bows to 
the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the 
process of trial and error so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in 
the judicial function.113 
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 While precedent might provide an out for justices wishing to avoid or overturn 
previous decisions, it is important not to confuse “experience and the force of better 
reasoning” with judicial activism. A justice doing what they want in spite of 
constitutional mandates is entirely distinct from learning that they were previously wrong 
about those mandates, and remedying the situation. 
 
III. Authority of Consent 
 
 Those methods that purport to derive their conclusions from consent do so by 
looking at the historical intention or understanding of provisions. It is believed by many 
that this is the best way to find legitimate authority. By looking at what the ratifiers 
intended a constitutional provision to do, or what the original public understanding would 
have yielded, the people’s consent that defines the law should be discernable, hence the 
name: Authority of Consent. Within the literature these methods often go by the name of 
Originalism. It comes in more than one flavor, but its purpose is to act as security from an 
overzealous judiciary usurping the power of the people and injecting their own moral 
ideals into a court decision. If the Constitution does not act as a restraint on judges then 
“[they] could govern areas not committed to them by specific clauses of the Constitution, 
there would be no law other than the will of the judge.”114  
 To be faithful to the Originalist doctrine a theorist must be able to demonstrate 
that their claim is based on “some textual or historical evidence.”115 Originalism 
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recognizes the importance of consent of the governed, and because legislation might be 
subjected to judicial review, it “legitimizes” the process.116 The Constitution might have 
evolving characteristics but the Originalist does not see a “basis for believing that 
supervision of the evolution would have been committed to the courts.”117 Instead, it is 
believed that change is most legitimately effected through the legislatures:  
 
[O]rginalism seems…more compatible with the nature and purpose of a 
Constitution in a democratic system. A democratic society does not, by and large, 
need constitutional guarantees to insure that its laws will reflect “current values.” 
Elections take care of that quite well.118 
 
This is the essence of the originalist argument. If society wants change, they can elect 
new representatives that will pass legislation in line with that change. To ask the courts 
for moral guidance can very well result in decisions like Dred Scott. To argue that the 
Constitution is not law, or is not binding subjects society to the moral predilections of the 
courts. Justice Rehnquist made the point, “there is no conceivable way in which I can 
logically demonstrate to you that the judgments of my conscience are superior to the 
judgments of your conscience, and vice versa.”119  
 Scalia has further made the salient point that the “purpose of constitutional 
guarantees” is to inhibit undesirable change in those original values that those who 
adopted the amendment saw fit to instill in the Constitution. If society wants to change 
one of these fundamental values, it must “devote to the subject the long and hard 
consideration required for a constitutional amendment before those particular values can 
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be cast aside.”120 The justice “has, after all, taken an oath to apply the laws and has been 
given no power to supplant them with rules of his own…if [a justice] feels strongly 
enough he can…[resign and] lead a political campaign…and if that fails, lead a 
revolution. But rewrite the laws he cannot do.”121 For the government to reflect a change 
in society’s moral values, that change must occur through constitutional amendment, not 
the courts. Of course, it should also be noted that change should not occur through defiant 
states either.  
 Originalism makes some salient points, but the bigger argument arises in regards 
to how specific Originalism should get. Too specific and it would require a court to 
uphold a flogging statute and allow school segregation, (as the ratifiers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment continued to segregate school districts well after its adoption), however if 
provisions are read too broadly, progressive tax laws or even age requirements for driving 
wouldn’t stand up to the Equal Protection Clause.  
 Originalism has its merits; after all, completely ignoring the dictates of the 
Constitution would produce chaos. It is faithful, it is enduring, and it most likely has a 
manifestation that can produce something close to impartial results. The problem, 
however, is that the versions espoused by those of Scalia, Bork, and many others are not 
it. Enacted at too specific a level produces a version of Originalism that is wholly 
impracticable, and usually a euphemism for moral interpretation.  
 Professor Erwin Chemerinsky writes, “[w]hat disturbs me about Justice Scalia’s 
jurisprudence is that by denying that it is making value choices, it pretends that its 
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decisions are a result of a neutral judicial methodology.”122 As this paper refers to 
Originalism it will be of the kind that is of Bork and Scalia. 
 Originalism, whether it is based on original intent as Judge Bork would prefer or 
the original public understanding (sometimes called textualism)123 as Justice Scalia would 
prefer, runs into several problems. Those covered here are: (1) there are instances where 
even the most conservative justices will not implement statutes that were perfectly 
constitutional at the time a law was adopted, making it no different than a moral 
interpretation; (2) originalists aim to find some kind of historical consensus at a very 
specific level beyond the explicit words adopted; and (3) although it will make a claim to 
the contrary, Originalism does not have the ability to cope with new phenomena, from 
changes in technology to changes in society. Two of these problems will be addressed 
here, and the third in Chapter Three. 
 To address the first point: Originalists congratulate themselves for belonging to a 
school of thought that is the pinnacle of judicial restraint and they chastise courts, and 
other justices, who do not subscribe to such a specific level of abstraction, as judicial 
activists. However, its impracticable nature requires just enough modification to nullify 
its existence: it becomes undergirded by moral relativism. Justice Scalia, one of 
Originalism’s most vociferous proponents, concedes that there is a problem with 
application if we know exactly what an originalist answer will provide, but find it 
morally repugnant: 
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I hasten to confess that in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist. I 
cannot imagine myself, any more than any other federal judge, upholding a 
statute that imposes the punishment of flogging.124 
 
 This is fine for many justices, but if the sole justification for maintaining an 
eighteenth or nineteenth century mindset is legitimacy, then what excuse, aside from 
moral relativism, is there to not uphold a flogging statute? The statement annuls any 
sense of judicial restraint. For a restrained interpreter to pull even a single punch, such as 
not upholding a flogging statute based on a moral decision, makes every other decision a 
moral choice. Death penalty? Scalia does not morally deem it worthy of pulling a punch. 
Sodomy laws? Scalia does not morally deem it worthy of pulling a punch, (and he offers 
scathing dissents despite his own admission of being a moral interpreter).125  
 In some cases, such as flogging, the originalist interpreter would no doubt look to 
precedent to justify why they will not uphold the statute. However, making that decision 
–when to use and when not to use precedent, or when to squint narrowly – is a moral one. 
As Professor Lawrence Tribe has written, 
 
Justice Scalia asserts that his assumption of the power to invoke stare decisis or 
not to do so does not leave him open to the charge of importing his own views 
and values into his method of interpretation, because he follows “rules” as to 
when the disregard of stare decisis is appropriate. But even if we assume that 
Justice Scalia has such “rules” for the selective invocation of stare decisis, and 
for whether to uphold some but not all erroneous decisions of the Supreme Court, 
what is the origin of those rules? They certainly are not derived from the 
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“original meaning” of the text of the Constitution, as Justice Scalia’s interpretive 
methodology would require.126 
 
 Scalia’s concession about being a faint-hearted originalist also shows the irony in 
this account of the Constitution. Flogging is brutal, as is ear clipping, but to hold that they 
are not constitutional under any circumstances while simultaneously holding that capital 
punishment is easily constitutional,127 would likely be deemed morally incongruous by 
many people.  
 This of course is only in application, and there is still the question of theory. 
Some will inquire as to the practicability of Originalism if a good-faith effort is engaged; 
that is, if a person were to hold a flogging statute as constitutional, as well as ear-
clipping, segregation, and so on, would Originalism be practicable, and therefore the 
most legitimate interpretation of our Constitution? This, however, is an impossibility, as 
there was no originally agreed-upon understanding. This leads to the second point that 
Chief Justice Marshall articulated, “historians can never forget that it is a debate they are 
interpreting.”128 
 Advocates of a specific level of Originalism concede that finding the original 
meaning is a challenge, and will offer their insights as to what the enterprise entails. 
Unfortunately, the challenge masks the incoherent nature of supposedly determinate 
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answers. Judge Robert Bork, a proponent of intent Originalism, offered a laundry list of 
places to uncover the original meaning: 
 
records of the Philadelphia convention, records of ratifying conventions, the 
newspaper accounts of the day, the Federalist Papers, the Anti-Federalist Papers, 
the constructions put upon the Constitution be early Congresses...executive 
branch officials...and...courts, as well as treatises by men who, like Joseph Story, 
were thoroughly familiar with the thought of the time.129 
 
Beyond that, Justice Scalia concluded that to properly ascertain an original meaning, 
 
[I]s often exceedingly difficult.... Properly done, the task requires the 
consideration of an enormous mass of material – in the case of the Constitution 
and its Amendments, for example, to mention only one element, the records of 
the ratifying debates in all the states. Even beyond that, it requires an evaluation 
of the reliability of that material—many of the reports of the ratifying debates, 
for example, are thought to be quite unreliable. And further still, it requires 
immersing oneself in the political and intellectual atmosphere of the time—
somehow placing out of mind knowledge that we have which an earlier age did 
not, and putting on beliefs, attitudes, philosophies, prejudices and loyalties that 
are not those of our day. It is, in short, a task sometimes better suited to the 
historian than the lawyer.130 
 
 Ironically, it is the historians that point to the futility of Originalism. Gordon 
Wood has observed, “it may be a necessary fiction for lawyers and jurists to believe in a 
‘correct’ or ‘true’ interpretation of the Constitution, in order to carry on their 
business.”131 Jack Rakove continued this line of thought and added that the most 
important task for historians “is to explain why ‘contrasting meanings’ were attached to 
the Constitution from its inception.”132 The dean of American constitutional historians, 
Leonard Levy made it very clear, 
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[T]he Supreme Court’s use of originalist evidence is best described as a mix of 
“law office history” and justificatory rhetoric which offers little reason to think 
that this method of interpretation can provide the faithful and accurate 
application of the original constitutional understandings its advocates promise.133 
 
The burden of discovering the original meaning of the provision in question is claimed to 
be “largely [a] factual matter requiring none of the moral and political reasoning 
appropriately undertaken by the creators of the constitution.”134 This, however, does not 
align with the facts. Looking for specific conclusions can produce numerous results from 
numerous individuals, but to claim that there was a consensus at such a specific level that 
can be reliably drawn from is intellectually dishonest. Having numerous individuals from 
which to pull allows a person to search legislative history and selectively pick the parts 
that support their point, or as Judge Harold Leventhal put it, it is like “looking over the 
crowd and picking your friends.”135 As will be established later, Judge Bork’s 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment is depictive of this problem. 
 In the Annals of Congress, Madison is noted as advising the framers “not to 
inquire into the details behind ‘abstract propositions, of which judgment may not be 
convinced.... [I]f we confine ourselves to an enumeration of simple, acknowledged 
principles, the ratification will meet with but little difficulty.”136 Without a consensus, 
what becomes constitutionally valid is contingent upon who is being quoted. In that 
sense, it is no more stable than a moral interpretation. 
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 As an example we can look at what is often considered one of the most concretely 
understood amendments: the First Amendment. The First Amendment prohibits the 
“abridge[ment] [of] the freedom of speech” among other things. It would be remarkably 
difficult to argue that there was a concrete consensus on the understanding or intention of 
the First Amendment when it was first adopted. Only eight years later there was 
significant debate by its ratifiers as to its meaning. The dominant Federalist Party enacted 
the Sedition Act in 1798 and argued “that the freedom of speech meant only freedom 
from prior restraint—in effect, freedom from an advance prohibition—and did not 
include any protection at all from punishment after publication.”137 Precedent may inform 
us as to exactly what the provision entails today, but that is certainly not an originalist 
approach, and invoking precedent here, but not elsewhere, is a patently moral decision.  
 Further, Justice Scalia uses the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual 
punishment clause as a kind of acid test for fitness of character to even be a judge. He 
believes any judge who is prepared to strike down capital punishment under any scenario 
– even in the case of “actual innocence”138 – should resign instead of “sabotage[] death 
penalty cases.”139 The history of the debate over the Eighth Amendment – the original 
understanding – shows that they were well aware that the Supreme Court might use its 
own discretion in such matters, and could even deem capital punishment, flogging, 
whipping, and ear clipping as cruel and unusual.140 
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 Indeed, finding an original consensus is not always easy, but worse is when an 
originalist believes they have found a consensus at a specific level and apply the 
provision in a manner antithetical to its purpose. One of the hardest arguments for 
Originalists to reconcile is the decision in Brown v. Board of Education. As the facts are 
that the Fourteenth Amendment was passed and that same Congress segregated the 
Washington D.C. school district, there is a general consensus amongst constitutional law 
scholars that at least one reason Originalism in the specific sense is problematic is that it 
cannot explain the Brown decision.141 In defense of intent-Originalism Judge Bork 
explained why it does in fact work with his version. To do this, however, he abandons his 
own method and views the Fourteenth Amendment at a broader view. In his book The 
Tempting of America, he writes: 
 
By 1954, when Brown came up for decision, it had been apparent for some time 
that segregation rarely if ever produced equality … the physical facilities 
provided for blacks were not as good as those provided for whites. That had been 
demonstrated in a long series of cases … The Court's realistic choice, therefore, 
was either to abandon the quest for equality by allowing segregation or to forbid 
segregation in order to achieve equality. There was no third choice. Either choice 
would violate one aspect of the original understanding, but there was no 
possibility of avoiding that. Since equality and segregation were mutually 
inconsistent, though the ratifiers did not understand that, both could not be 
honored. When that is seen, it is obvious the Court must choose equality and 
prohibit state-imposed segregation. The purpose that brought the fourteenth 
amendment into being was equality before the law, and equality, not separation, 
was written into the law.142 
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 Judge Bork is correct. To choose segregation, just because the ratifiers thought it 
was permissible, and because it was within the moral perceptions of the time is to ignore 
the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment. The new knowledge that separate but equal 
did not produce equality meant that segregation was inarguably violating the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The state legislatures and the justices in Plessy v. Ferguson143 did not know 
this, but as Chapter Three will explore, that is the nature of facts – there is a distinction 
between what we know and what we believe we know.  
 Judicial restraint is important, and some form of Originalism might have it. But 
considering at a specific level (a) there is a lack of consensus imbedded in constitutional 
provisions, and considering (b) the ability to choose when to use precedent, and 
particularly detrimental to its case is (c) the fact that it can lead to implementing statutes 
which are explicitly antipodal to the purpose of an amendment, any argument for 
adhering to the specifics of an eighteenth or nineteenth century mindset seems 
considerably weakened. 
 Interpretation is not black and white. The Constitution cannot be read as literal 
and absolute, like radio instructions. If it were then laws against perjury would be 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment, and individuals would be permitted to 
acquire nuclear weapons under the Second Amendment. The process of elucidating what 
the Constitution holds often seems to succumb to Tushnet’s assessment that justices use it 
more as a rhetorical device to find their preferred conclusions. This, however, might be 
somewhat hyperbolic. It seems that if justices can find a level of abstraction – even a 
version of Originalism – that allows them to stay consistent over time, they might be able 
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to show the restraint that they are after. That is, if a justice subscribes to Originalism and 
in one case uses an exacting specification to hold up something like flogging, but in 
another instance allows the text to adapt and strikes down segregation laws, then they are 
not being consistent and not showing restraint. They are essentially hiding behind 
Originalism to invoke their moral decisions. Professor Herbert Wechsler articulated this 
point when he asked:  
 
To be sure, the courts decide, or should decide, only the case they have before 
them. But must they not decide on grounds of adequate neutrality and generality, 
tested not only by the instant application but by others that the principles imply? 
Is it not the very essence of judicial method to insist upon attending to such other 
cases, preferably those involving an opposing interest, in evaluating any principle 
avowed?144  
 
More recently the point was articulated by Gene R. Nichol, “constitutional theories are 
meant to be applied to cases in which we like the results and to cases in which we dislike 
the results.”145  
 The debate over interpretation is unlikely to be solved any time soon. What can be 
asserted is that for any method of interpretation to claim fidelity to the Constitution, it 
requires some level of analysis that allows for the specifics to change, but not the purpose 
of the amendment. Chapter Three will address why change is inevitable and Chapter Four 
will discuss the Equal Protection Clause in light of its original construction. 
  
                                                
144 Herbert Wechsler, “Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,” Harvard Law Review 73, No. 1 
(Nov. 1959): 15. 
145 Gene R. Nichol, “Justice Scalia and the Printz Case: The Trials of an Occasional Originalist,” 





Inevitable Evolution & Epistemology 
 
[W]e may add that, when we are dealing with words that also are a 
constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize 
that they have called into life a being the development of which could not 
have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters…. The 
case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience and 
not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago…. We must 
consider what this country has become in deciding what that amendment 
has reserved. 
 
– Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
1920146 
 
 The debate over whether a change to the Constitution is more faithfully executed 
in the courts or the legislatures usually begins with a discussion of the counter-
majoritarian difficulty and ends with the idea that since the government derives its power 
from the people, change should most often occur in the legislatures. What this point 
misses is that sometimes there is no change, only a mistake about the facts.  
 In Judge Bork’s Brown example, segregation never did produce equality. That 
was the fact regardless of what the ratifiers believed the facts to be. Once that became 
obvious the legislatures had an obligation to bring their legislation in line with the 
Constitution and if it ended up in court, the court had an obligation to overturn it. 
 The facts did not change, only what the legislatures and courts knew about the 
facts. In this case, it would certainly be preferable for the legislatures to remove 
legislation that is repugnant to the Constitution, but if the courts should find themselves 
with a case in front of them where state legislation is inarguably repugnant to the 
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Constitution, they don’t have a choice but to strike it down. As it was stated in Chapter 
Two, there is a cogent difference between judicial activism, and learning that a mistake 
was made and remedying the situation.  
 The point that Bork made, that although “equality and segregation were mutually 
inconsistent…the ratifiers did not understand that,” is the epistemological point. New 
facts change the reference but not the meaning of Constitutional provisions. The meaning 
of the Fourteenth Amendment never changed, but once it was discovered that segregation 
did not in fact produce equality, the reference of the Fourteenth Amendment changed. As 
Bork concludes, “…The purpose that brought the fourteenth amendment into being was 
equality before the law, and equality, not separation, was written into the law.”147 
 Arguing a similar point, British economist and political philosopher Friedrich 
Hayek argued in 1960 that the treatment of homosexuality was “[t]he most conspicuous 
instance of” illegitimate state coercion.148 He then approvingly quotes Bertrand Russell, 
and adds his own point, 
 
…“if it were still believed, as it once was, that the toleration of such behavior 
would expose the community to the fate of Sodom and Gomorrah, the 
community would have every right to intervene.” But where such factual beliefs 
do not prevail, private practice among adults, however abhorrent it may be to the 
majority, is not a proper subject for coercive action for a state whose object is to 
minimize coercion.149 
 
Hayek’s point, that learning new facts necessarily changes the implications of proper 
state coercion is not a small one. This leads to a point that is the meat of why 
constitutional provisions will change their reference without changing their meaning, and 
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happens regardless of whether society or the legal system acknowledges it. Change in 
reference is a consequence of gaining knowledge, and is no more preventable than the 
progression of time. Without allowing room to expand, the Constitution would become 
brittle, ineffectual and irrelevant. This point might be deemed living by some, but 
interestingly, even the most professedly restrained and often conservative justices 
concede this point.  
 Scalia refers to a trajectory he looks for when a case involves “new phenomena:”  
 
How, for example, does the First Amendment guarantee of “the freedom of 
speech” apply to new technologies that did not exist when the guarantee was 
created—to sound trucks, or to government-licensed over-the-air television? In 
such new fields the Court must follow the trajectory of the First Amendment, so 
to speak, to determine what it requires—and assuredly that enterprise is not 
entirely cut-and-dried by requires the exercise of judgment.150 
 
He clarifies this trajectory idea later in his book, 
 
I…believe that the Eighth Amendment is no mere “concrete and dated rule” but 
rather an abstract principle. If I did not hold this belief, I would not be able to 
apply the Eighth Amendment (as I assuredly do) to all sorts of tortures quite 
unknown at the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted.151 
 
Judge Bork says, 
 
[C]ourts must not hesitate to apply old values to new circumstances. A judge who 
refuses to deal with unforeseen threats to an established constitutional value, and 
hence provides a crabbed interpretation that robs a provision of its full, fair, and 
reasonable meaning, fails his judicial duty.152 
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Of course, he goes on to warn that “[i]n stating the value that is to be protected, the judge 
must not state it with so much generality that he transforms it.”153  
 He says the idea of applying old values to new circumstances is why “electronic 
media” is covered by the First Amendment, electronic surveillance is prohibited in 
certain cases by the Fourth Amendment’s protection from unreasonable searches and 
seizures, and even why the Commerce Clause is applied to state regulation of interstate 
trucking;154 it is because the reference of the Constitution expands. Former Attorney 
General and originalist, Edwin Meese’s assessment was simple and to the point: 
 
Where the language of the Constitution is specific, it must be obeyed. Where 
there is a demonstrable consensus among the Framers and ratifiers as to a 
principle stated or implied by the Constitution, it should be followed. Where 
there is ambiguity as to the precise meaning or reach of a constitutional 
provision, it should be interpreted and applied in a manner so as to at least not 
contradict the Constitution itself.155 
 
This concept might open up the Constitution to imputing moral standards, but ultimately 
the idea is the inevitable consequence of a static document being applied to a society that 
incurs change independent of the government. While there is usually no single original 
consensus in a specific sense, it seems that moral inclinations can be minimized by at 
least understanding the original purpose at a broad level. This way the virtue of restraint 
can be realized through consistent application over time. 
 A document that is meant to remain applicable over a long period will necessarily 
have its reference broadened, and the Fourteenth Amendment is no different than the 
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First or Eighth Amendments. The reference of the “freedom of speech,” or “cruel and 
unusual punishment,” is extended to “new phenomena” such as radio, television, or 
“tortures quite unknown.” The reference of the Amendments are expanded because of 
new technological facts, and as Judge Bork’s point demonstrated, if there are similarly 
social facts that emerge as a result of gaining knowledge, there would be a change to the 
reference of the Fourteenth Amendment. As Professor Adele Mercier points out, “[s]ocial 
facts may have a different aetiology than natural and technological facts…but they are 
ontologically on par as facts.”156 
 If the courts were ever convinced that separate-but-equal actually resulted in 
equality, by 1954 it had become known as a matter-of-fact that it did not. Any 
“anticipation that it would…was simply a mistake about the facts.”157 In the choice 
between adhering to the purpose of the amendment with the consideration of new facts or 
upholding a statute that would require disregarding new facts, Bork concludes that the 
court must choose the former. This explains why Brown, Loving, and Reed cannot be 
deemed judicial activism, but rather exactly in line with the purpose of the amendment. 
Similar to segregation, new social facts have emerged about interracial marriage, women 
and now sexual orientation.  
 Importantly there is a distinction to make between an object, and knowledge as it 
pertains to that object. Using Scalia’s trajectory metaphor, segregation is an institution 
with which the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were familiar, but it was the 
knowledge that it did not produce equality that changed the institution as it related to the 
amendment. The trajectory of the amendment did not change, but the knowledge that 
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separate but equal did not produce equality moved segregation into the trajectory of the 
amendment. That is, the meaning of the amendment did not change, but its reference did. 
To elucidate the difference, Mercier gives an example, “If I live on an island where there 
are only maples and pines, and so I have only applied the word ‘tree’ to maples and 
pines, that nowise means that when I visit the mainland and bump into a beech, I cannot, 
or even ought not, call it a tree.”158 The new knowledge expands the reference of the 
word “tree.”  
 The same can be said for the Reed decision, which in 1971 said women were 
constitutionally equal to men. Women – the object – were of course not new, but the 
knowledge that they were equally as capable as men was new information, assuming the 
honesty of the assessments contemporary men gave of women. Note that this says 
nothing about the open mindedness of people, as it could have certainly been figured out 
before 1971 that women were equal to men, but it was not until then that the Court 
recognized the fact. 
 In 1869 Mill criticized the argument that women were naturally inferior to men 
and should be dissuaded from participating in certain activities. He rightly argued that 
“…Until conditions of equality exist, no one can possibly assess the natural differences 
between women and men, distorted as they have been.”159 In his view, such a confident 
declaration cannot be made without evidence. Mill made this point four years before the 
U.S. Supreme Court was writing, “…The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which 
                                                
158 Adele Mercier, 2001, Affidavit to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice regarding Halpern et al. v. 
Canada, Kingston, ON: Queens University Philosophy Department and Linguistics Program. 
159 John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women, (London, UK: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1869), 
Project Gutenberg, October 2008. 
 55 
belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life,”160 
and forty-two years before it was argued that “Woman is woman. She can not unsex 
herself or change her sphere. Let her be content with her lot and perform those high 
duties intended for her by the Great Creator, and she will accomplish far more in 
governmental affairs than she can ever accomplish by mixing up in the dirty pool of 
politics.”161 
 Segregation did not produce equality, “though the ratifiers did not understand 
that.” Women are as capable as men, “though the ratifiers did not understand that.” 
Sexual orientation is an immutable characteristic and same-sex marriage will not harm 
society, “though the ratifiers did not understand that.” These are all social facts and as 
Mercier points out, “the facts were the facts regardless of what we believed them to 
be.”162  
 In the nineteenth century the facts about sexual orientation and same-sex marriage 
were wrong or non-existent. Arguing against the pillory in 1816, Michael Taylor noted 
that “no punishment, however severe, appeared to deter persons addicted to this atrocious 
offense.”163 While “homosexual subcultures[] certainly existed, even thrived” in the mid 
to late nineteenth century, they “existed in isolation and near invisibility.” This did not 
                                                
160 Bradwell v. State of Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873). 
161 J.B. Sanford, “Reasons Why Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 8 Should Not be Adopted,” vol. 11 
of The California Outlook: A Progressive Weekly,” (September 16, 1911), www.books.google.com. For a 
more thorough discussion on women and the Equal Protection Clause see Calabresi, “Originalism and Sex 
Discrimination,” (2011). (Calabresi demonstrates that women were given equal civil rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and when the Nineteenth Amendment was adopted they were finally given equal 
political rights.) 
162 Mercier, “Re: question from a student,” (2012) 
163 Nicholas C. Edsall, Toward Stonewall: Homosexuality and Society in the Modern Western World, 
(Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2003), 63. 
 56 
change in the United States until the end of the nineteenth century,164 but certainly not 
before the reconstruction amendments were adopted. Even as late as the 1890s educated 
contemporaries were unaware of the distinction between a sexual act and a sexual 
orientation. The trial of Oscar Wilde for “gross indecency” demonstrates this. The 
judge’s condemnation reverberates with this unawareness: 
 
The crime of which you have been convicted is so bad that one has to put stern 
restraint upon one’s self to prevent one’s self from describing… the sentiments 
which must rise to the breast of every man of honor who has heard the details of 
these two terrible trials…. It is of no use for me to address you. People who can 
do these things must be dead to all sense of shame, and one cannot hope to 
produce any effect upon them. It is the worst case I have ever tried…. I shall, 
under the circumstances, be expected to pass the severest sentence that the law 
allows. In my judgment it is totally inadequate for such a case as this.165 
 
 That sexual orientation cannot only be different in different people, but that it is 
an immutable characteristic would have been a surprise to many. This fact though, has 
always been the case. Where it implicates the Constitution is where that fact is unearthed 
and sexual orientation becomes part of a descriptive trait of a person, the way hair color, 
race, or height are. 
 This leads to two points: (1) if same-sex marriage had been discussed during the 
debates over the Fourteenth Amendment, it would have been deemed negative and would 
not have been included under the Equal Protection Clause. However, just like 
segregation, the ascertainment of new knowledge changes constitutional implications. To 
ask what ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment would have thought about same-sex 
marriage and to do this by projecting backwards the sole idea of same-sex marriage 
without the accompanying facts that have been well established over the last half-century 
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is specious reasoning. It would be similar to asking what the 39th Congress might have 
thought about internet legislation without assuming proper knowledge of a computer; 
assuming their position on a question without assuming knowledge of facts that define it 
produces a nonsensical and irrelevant result. And (2) same-sex marriage was not 
considered. Bearing in mind the utter lack of knowledge about sexual orientation, same-
sex marriage would be more akin to a new phenomena for which the trajectory would 
have to be ascertained.  
 When the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment pronounced that all persons 
would be treated equally under the law, they certainly did not conceive of every 
difference between individuals, nor could they have rationally been expected to do so. 
The argument that because sexual orientation was not considered during the debates over 
the Equal Protection Clause and therefore it has not been decided by the people that it 
should be protected, is incorrect. It has been decided. There are an infinite amount of 
personal qualities that can be said to have not gone through the minds of those ratifiers. 
All a person need do is ponder what the argument would be if it were over a trait 
considered benign, such as hair color.  
 In a hypothetical thought experiment, if red hair had been completely unknown to 
the ratifiers and one day in the twentieth century a red-haired child were born, would that 
child not deserve equal protection of the laws? The question is bizarre. Just because they 
did not consider a trait is not sufficient to remove it from equal protection. It seems the 
reason that sexual orientation is on the chopping block is three-fold: (1) sexual 
orientation implies behavior, (2) that behavior concerns sex, and (3) that sexual behavior 
was illegal at the time of ratification.  
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 The fact that it implies behavior is moot, unless that behavior creates a rational 
basis for not applying the amendment. For example, psychosis may be immutable, but the 
behavior it implies provides a rational basis for proscribing action based on that 
characteristic. On the other hand if the thought experiment concerned obesity – certainly 
something that implies behavior (and usually has some aspect of choice) – it is doubtful 
that there would there be a weight limit for equal protection. Perhaps an even closer 
analogy would be something similar to ADHD. ADHD implies behavior and might be an 
immutable characteristic, which the ratifiers would not have considered but those with 
ADHD are not suddenly uncovered nor is their behavior – as long as there is no rational 
basis for its proscription. A person may argue that the difference is that the actions 
implicit with ADHD – perhaps talking quickly, or losing train of thought – were not 
illegal in 1868, whereas sodomy was. This ignores the implication of new knowledge, 
(and the effect of new knowledge on static provisions as demonstrated by the segregation 
example). When it became evident that sexual orientation is immutable and part of the 
person, the Supreme Court was forced to change its reading of the Equal Protection 
Clause. Whereas the sodomite was seen as person + s, where s is a crime like any other, 
the homosexual is seen as just person, and certainly person is what the Equal Protection 
Clause was meant to cover.  
 As familiarity with sexual orientation grew, states overturned their discriminatory 
legislation, which “brand[ed] all homosexuals as criminals”166 and in those states that 
failed to do so, the Supreme Court appropriately stepped in and did its job of defending 
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the Constitution.167 The Supreme Court has readily acknowledged this in the language of 
Romer v. Evans when Justice Kennedy wrote that the Equal Protection Clause is “a 
commitment to the law's neutrality where the rights of persons are at stake,”168 and 
subsequently struck down a provision in Colorado’s state constitution because it violated 
the rights of persons with a non-heterosexual sexual orientation. In Lawrence v. Texas the 
wording similarly expresses this sentiment: “[t]hose harmed by this law are people who 
have a same-sex sexual orientation and thus are more likely to engage in behavior 
prohibited.”169 The new knowledge added sexual orientation to the definition of person 
and changed the reference of the amendment in the same way new knowledge about 
segregation or new knowledge about technology expands the reference of those 
respective amendments. It was then affirmed in 2010, that the Supreme Court’s 
“decisions have declined to distinguish between status and conduct in [the context of 
sexual orientation.]170 
 The unique fight that sexual orientation has had of whether it is immutable, it 
seems, is what opposition to gay rights turns on. Considering that orientation is an 
immutable trait inseparable from the person, whether it was known at the time or not, the 
gay population is necessarily covered by the Equal Protection Clause, and the case of 
same-sex marriage, then, does in fact at least raise a question that belongs in the Supreme 
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Court. In the Supreme Court the question will be in regards to whether same-sex and 
different-sex marriages are equivalent in the relevant areas as it pertains to the state. This 
will be answered in Chapter Six. 
 If state laws that implement segregation or prohibit same-sex marriage are 
discovered to violate equal protection the only way they would be able to surmount the 
Fourteenth Amendment would be to further amend the Constitution. After all, 
segregation, or the prohibition of same-sex marriage, were not what was debated, 
thoughtfully considered, and added as an amendment – equal protection was. In that vein 
President George W. Bush gave a speech in favor of a constitutional amendment saying 
that marriage would only be recognized between one man and one woman; this would in 
fact overcome the Equal Protection Clause. Opponents to same-sex marriage have the 




                                                








Passions and Prejudice 
 
If a thing has been practised for two hundred years by common consent, it 
will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it. 
 
- Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
1922172 
 
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our power 
to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be 
imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the 
several States. 
 
- Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
1913173 
 
 Regardless of the interpretive method used, all theorists acknowledge that there 
must be some room for change in reference to accommodate new phenomena. The 
knowledge of sexual orientation and the concept of same-sex marriage are new in the 
U.S., and although new social facts are no different than technological facts, 
ontologically speaking, some will ignore the dictates that they have set for new 
phenomena and plainly argue that because homosexuality in some form was around, and 
because it was not considered during the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment that an 
expansion of the amendment cannot support sexual orientation. 
 When addressing how general a provision can be read, according to intent-
Originalism, Judge Bork gives the following hypothetical: 
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Assume for the sake of the argument that a judge’s study of the evidence shows 
that both black and general racial equality were clearly intended, but that equality 
on matters such as sexual orientation was not under discussion. 
 
The [intent originalist] may conclude that he can enforce black and racial 
equality but that he had no guidance at all about any higher level of generality. 
He has, therefore, no warrant to displace a legislative choice that prohibits certain 
forms of sexual behavior.174 
 
To be sure, the conception that the Fourteenth Amendment makes particular distinctions 
in its allotment for equal protection is a conception that Bork, Scalia, and others have 
propounded for decades. As this chapter discusses, it is incorrect. The ratifiers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment had the opportunity to make the amendment specific to race, but 
they struck it down for an amendment that would cover all persons. They didn’t parse 
equal protection into categories, make a mistake, or carelessly leave it too broad. It is 
meant to assure that all laws apply to all persons equally. 
 Some will argue that the term equality is too vague to elicit anything concrete. 
While there are different conceptions and scopes of equality, that which is laid down in 
the Fourteenth Amendment has a specific meaning, and like all laws described with 
words, there are boundaries which do not require a treatise on the word to discern.  
 Kurt Vonnegut’s opening to “Harrison Bergeron” begins, 
 
The year was 2081, and everybody was finally equal. They weren’t only equal 
before God and the law. They were equal every which way. Nobody was smarter 
than anybody else. Nobody was better looking than anybody else. Nobody was 
stronger or quicker than anybody else. All this equality was due to the 211th, 
212th, and 213th Amendments to the Constitution, and to the unceasing vigilance 
of agents of the United States Handicapper General.175 
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This, it should be obvious, is not the conception that the ratifiers had in mind. Some will 
throw their hands up as if to say the pursuit for equality is a fruitless one. Simply put, the 
equality provision in the Fourteenth Amendment is similar to that of Hayek’s equality 
requirement in his conception of the rule of law: “equality prohibit[s] the enactment of 
laws that ma[ke] arbitrary distinctions among people.”176 Just like the First Amendment 
that guarantees freedom of speech – there are exceptions. In the case of the First 
Amendment it might be perjury laws, in the case of the Fourteenth Amendment it might 
be age restrictions on driving, or taxation laws. But these exceptions are not arbitrary and 
therefore do not confuse the word – it is not a nebulous concept; although some will 
become distracted with such semantic debates.177  
 The Equal Protection Clause was “in every draft of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”178 It’s construction was volatile to be sure, but it is clear that it was never 
meant to be restricted to race legislation alone. Judge Bork disagrees with this, and to 
find his evidence in history he quotes the infamous Slaughter-House Cases. In 1873 
Justice Miller wrote, 
 
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of 
discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever 
be held to come within the purview of [the Equal Protection Clause.]179 
 
 Judge Bork concludes from this, that “[t]he fourteenth amendment … had little 
reach beyond the protection of those who had been slaves…. In a word, the history of the 
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fourteenth amendment gave judges no guidance on any subject other than the protection 
of blacks. Beyond that the justices had nothing more to apply than their personal 
views.”180 
 Of course, as it has been established precedent is imperfect. Dealing with any of 
the reconstruction amendments takes special care, as there are multiple examples of 
legislatures and courts invoking their own moral ideas at the expense of the 
Constitution,181 and few amendments have brought forth the infighting and misperception 
as the Fourteenth Amendment. Still, it is awkward that Bork would use a court opinion so 
reviled that “[v]irtually no serious modern scholar—left, right, and center—thinks that 
[the Slaughter-House interpretation] is a plausible reading of the Amendment.”182 
 First, it deserves mention that Bork is not being completely forthright with the 
quote he is using. It is accurate, and it was put forward in the Slaughter-House opinion, 
but in the following sentence the court says even though they do not think the Equal 
Protection Clause is relevant in this case, they feel that the question of whether it relates 
to persons other than blacks is not a matter that concerns them at the present moment and 
that until “some case of State oppression, by denial of equal justice…shall have claimed a 
decision at our hands” the court “may safely leave the matter alone.”183 Several years 
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later when the question was answered by the court the same justice Miller joined the 
majority opinions that affirmed the Equal Protection Clause applied to all persons.184 
 Second, the history of the Fourteenth Amendment does not support Bork’s 
reading. While legislative history will allow a person to “pick their friends,” there is no 
logical way a person familiar with the history of the Fourteenth Amendment can come to 
his conclusion. The first draft of the Fourteenth Amendment did limit the Equal 
Protection Clause to racial inequality; it was struck down. As passed, it was specifically 
designed to do two things: (1) “alter the relationship between the states and the federal 
government,” and (2) guarantee that legislation be applied equally to all persons. 185 To 
be sure, there were those who spoke in favor of classes, who were against a broader 
application, and who only wanted it to apply to race; they were defeated. 
 In early April 1866, the first draft of the Fourteenth Amendment was submitted. It 
read: 
 
Section 1. No discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the United States, 
as to the civil rights of persons because of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude. 
 
Sec. 2. From and after the fourth day of July, in the year one thousand eight 
hundred and seventy-six, no discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the 
United States, as to the enjoyment by classes of persons of the right of suffrage, 
because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 
 
Sec. 3. Until the fourth day of July, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-six, 
no class of persons, as to the right of any of whom to suffrage discrimination 
shall be made by any state, because of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude, shall be included in the basis of representation.186 
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This version was rejected and by April 30, another version was submitted that dropped 
any allusion to race. The Amendment’s broader text was explained by Senator Howard: it 
“disable[s] a State…from denying to [any person] the equal protection of the laws of the 
States. This abolishes all class legislation in the States and does away with the injustice of 
subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another.”187 
 Further, it was known that broad rights can be interpreted broadly by the courts. 
For that reason, it was stressed that the Amendment should be as specific as they believed 
necessary. From the minority report from the Joint Committee of the Indiana General 
Assembly: 
 
We have seen so many instances of stretching the powers of government in the 
last few years, by resorting to new and startling constructions of what seemed to 
be plain provisions, plainly written, that we feel the time has come when 
proposed amendments should be freed from all ambiguity; and therefore we are 
unwilling to sanction any new proposal to confer power upon the Federal 
Government, by amending the Constitution, until we know its precise scope and 
meaning.188 
 
 The Equal Protection Clause is often mistaken as vague. It seems that in light of 
the country’s age and experience with the Supreme Court they were well aware of how 
specific they were going to have to make the amendment, and they chose specifically to 
make it broad. That is, it isn’t an inconclusive or unsettled statement of equality; it is a 
statement of equality settled on the notion that it is without exception.  
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 In June of 1866 the final text was formally presented to the states. The National 
Republican Party published an account of the 39th Congress, congratulating themselves 
for abolishing any sense of caste: 
 
The Republicans in Congress sought by legislation and by constitutional 
amendment to guarantee to every citizen of the republic the equality of civil 
rights before the law. How much did the Democrats do toward that object? 
 
The Republicans in Congress sought to break up the foundations of secession and 
rebellion by making citizenship national and not sectional. How much did the 
Democrats do toward that object? The Republicans in Congress tried to the 
extent of their powers to abolish throughout the bounds of the republic the evils 
of caste, as second only to those of slavery. How much did the Democrats do 
toward that object?189 
 
As Calabresi notes, “the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment gave state legislators 
ample notice that they understood the Amendment to prohibit caste or systems of special-
interest and class-based lawmaking.”190 The original intent was to use a universal 
quantifier in place of a particular quantifier.  
 Unfortunately, the nature of passions and prejudice lends itself to improper 
application of the Constitution. The manifestation of defiance in court cases is one of the 
reasons that while precedent is important, it is imperfect. In 1885, the same justice who 
wrote the Slaughter-House opinion was part of the majority in two cases, Barbier v. 
Connolly, and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, that stated the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause 
quite differently. In Barbier v. Connolly it was said that, 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment…undoubtedly intended not only that there should be 
no arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of property, but 
that equal protection and security should be given to all under like circumstances 
in the enjoyment of their personal and civil rights; that all persons should be 
equally entitled to pursue their happiness and … that no impediment should be 
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interposed to the pursuits of anyone except as applied to the same pursuits by 
others under like circumstances; that no greater burdens should be laid upon one 
than are laid upon others in the same calling and condition; and …Class 
legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is prohibited…191 
 
 A year after Barbier, the Supreme Court said in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, that “just and 
equal laws” were necessary “so that, in the famous language of the Massachusetts Bill of 
Rights, the government of the commonwealth ‘may be a government of laws, and not of 
men.’” They went on to express their abhorrence of the idea that “one man may be 
compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the 
enjoyment of life at the mere will of another.” This, they said, is “the essence of slavery 
itself.”192  
 The court continued to elucidate exactly what they believed the purpose of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was which included a prohibition even of laws which appeared 
prima facie equal, but whose effects in operation were decidedly unequal: 
 
[T]he facts shown establish an administration directed so exclusively against a 
particular class of persons as to warrant and require the conclusion that, whatever 
may have been the intent of the ordinances as adopted, they are applied…with a 
mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the State of 
that equal protection of the laws which is secured to the petitioners, as to all other 
persons, by the broad and benign provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States. Though the law itself be fair on its face and 
impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority 
with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal 
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, 
the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.193 
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 The implication of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as 
adopted was simple. As stated by the justices in Yick Wo, it only required that laws be 
applied equally so that we may be a country of laws and not of men.  
 It should not go unnoticed that the decision in Yick Wo concerned Chinese 
immigrants, a minority with which the court had little familiarity. As such, it was likely 
able to remain more impartial than it did in Plessy v. Ferguson, which did not overturn 
Yick Wo so much as simply ignore it. Peter Irons suggests this is one reason Yick Wo fell 
to relative obscurity,  
 
Unlike blacks, who numbered some five million at the time, fewer than 100,000 
Chinese lived in the United States, the vast majority in California. The institution 
of slavery had provoked a bloody Civil War, while the Chinese…were ignored 
by most people outside the West Coast. And the Supreme Court disposed of the 
case without dissent…194 
 
If there was ever an argument for the importance of a court being disinterested in its 
ruling, the difference between Yick Wo and Plessy demonstrate that need.  
 Despite losing the Civil War, or perhaps because of losing the Civil War, many 
Southerners made it clear that they “had no intention of treating the [black] freemen as 
political equals, or even as fellow humans.”195 This became obvious with devices like the 
Black Codes which were an attempt to return blacks to a condition similar to that of 
slavery. Among other things, it restricted their movement, often forced them into labor 
contracts, and prevented them from owning firearms, suing, or testifying in court.196 The 
will of a zealous majority is not quelled easily.  
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 Before the former Confederate states were readmitted to the Union, they were 
required to adopt new state constitutions and ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. As many 
would freely admit, there was little intention of following the Constitution. In 1873, The 
Birmingham News wrote, “The rights guaranteed by the State and Federal constitutions 
do not frighten us in the least. We do not expect to repeal any of the recent enactments. 
[The reconstruction amendments] may stand forever—but we intend…to make them 
dead-letters on the statute-book.”197 Indeed, even after the amendments to the 
Constitution were added, a defiant south fought every expression of those amendments. 
 Through the end of the Nineteenth Century and beginning of the Twentieth 
Century, violence escalated towards blacks who challenged “the established usages, 
customs, and traditions” of white southerners. It was these traditions that would later be 
cited in Plessy v. Ferguson to uphold the unconstitutional Jim Crow laws.198 By 1938 
violence towards minorities both here and abroad had taken its toll on one justice who 
made the moral decision that he would take action; it was morals fighting morals. Justice 
Stone expressed his concerns in a letter to a New York Judge regarding the gruesome 
stories being reported of lynch mobs torturing and killing blacks in the south199 and the 
abuse of the Jewish population in Austria at the hands of Nazis. Spurred by violence that 
“seem[ed] to bedevil the world”200 he composed a footnote for a seemingly arbitrary case, 
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his Carolene Products opinion,201 that would go on to establish a tiered judicial review 
system. 
 The footnote was important for the distinction it made between economic 
legislation and civil rights legislation. The case was concerned with the Filled Milk Act 
of 1923, and the court held that they would “presume the constitutionality of regulatory 
laws ‘affecting ordinary commercial transactions’,” but if legislation reflects “prejudice 
against discrete and insular minorities” it might be necessary to use a “more searching 
judicial inquiry,”202 which came to be known as Strict Scrutiny.  
 Footnote 4 and Strict Scrutiny became powerful weapons for minorities. Between 
1938 and 1955, the NAACP took thirty-two cases to court and won twenty-nine of 
them.203 But as powerful as they became, they never should have been needed. If it had 
not been for vehement prejudice engulfing and crippling reason that was leading to such 
violence, the Fourteenth Amendment, as it was originally adopted and even applied in 
Barbier v. Connolly and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, would have covered the same cases. 
 It was later clarified that because laws by their nature do often classify 
individuals, “[t]he mere fact of classification will not void legislation.”204 To reconcile 
this practical reality with the Equal Protection Clause it was clarified that it is only 
‘invidious discrimination’ which offends the Constitution.”205  
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 It is true that legislatures are charged with the arduous task of fitting imperfect 
legislation onto a diverse polity for the sake of social order. The important point is that 
these laws cannot violate the Constitution. In 1917, before Footnote 4 had been created, it 
was said that 
 
It is urged that this proposed segregation will promote the public peace by 
preventing race conflicts. Desirable as this is, and important as is the preservation 
of the public peace, this aim cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances 
which deny rights created or protected by the Federal Constitution.206 
 
More recently the dissenting opinion in Plessy was quoted in the gay-rights case Romer v. 
Evans, suggesting that the law may not create “classes”: 
 
One century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this Court that the 
Constitution "neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 559 (1896) (dissenting opinion). Unheeded then, those 
words now are understood to state a commitment to the law's neutrality where the 
rights of persons are at stake.207 
 
 This ruling is not only directly in line with the Fourteenth Amendment’s actual 
precedent, it corresponds with Calabresi’s point: the grounds to prohibit discrimination 
are more easily answered when Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
“understood in the way that it was understood originally: as enacting a rule against class 
legislation and systems of caste.” This was further clarified in 1869 by Senator Charles 
Sumner in his lecture The Question of Caste.208  
 Judge Bork has given very reasonable standards to adhere to intent-Originalism in 
the face of unforeseen circumstances: 
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[A]ll an intentionalist requires is that the text, structure, and history of the 
Constitution provide him not with a conclusion but with a premise. That premise 
states a core value that the framers intended to protect. The intentionalist judge 
must then supply the minor premise in order to protect the constitutional freedom 
in circumstances the Framers could not foresee.209 
 
If Originalism allows for the references of provisions to expand in the face of unforeseen 
circumstances, and if equal protection encompasses all people, it is unlikely that Bork or 
Scalia would like what history would produce. When Judge Bork gives his reasoning for 
how broadly an amendment can be read, he is not just saying that they must be read in the 
sense of exactly what was discussed. He makes this clear, as does Scalia, by offering a 
trajectory for new phenomena. The level of generality Bork believes is in the Equal 
Protection Clause is race. It is with this reading he is able to explain that as new social 
facts emerged, they affected the constitutionality of segregation. As the case is that the 
Equal Protection Clause encompasses all persons, the only implicit exceptions are those 
for which there is a rational basis. As discussed in the following two chapters there is no 
such basis. 
 It should be noted that Judge Bork has not been discreet about his feelings 
towards the gay community. In Slouching Towards Gomorrah, he warns of the 
“homosexual movement,” and how this threat of modern liberalism is “assault[ing]” 
“American’s culture… from within.”210 It seems for all the merits that Originalism – at 
least at a broad level – might have, those who invoke it the most fervently often use it as 
a guise to promote their own partisan ideals. It also shows the problem of any interpretive 
method. If used impartially and consistently it might have restraint, but in the wrong 
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hands, any method can become a warped husk of its former self. After all, even the 
infamous Dred Scott decision started out with an appeal to Originalism.211 
 It seems that the inclusion of all persons under the Equal Protection Clause, and 
whether by trajectory, or the change that social facts have on old provisions, sexual 
orientation can be securely placed under the Equal Protection Clause.  
 In the Supreme Court, the question becomes how do we determine where the line 
should be drawn between acceptable classification and “invidious discrimination?” The 
Supreme Court has noted that “[c]lassifications which are purposefully discriminatory 
fall before the Equal Protection Clause,”212 and that the key requirement “[e]xplicit in all 
the formulations is that a legislature must have had a permissible purpose.”213 This 
requirement is a small enough hurdle that state legislation almost always passes it: “[s]o 
deferential is the classification that it denies the challenging party any right to offer 
evidence to seek to prove that the legislature is wrong in its conclusion that its 
classification will serve the purpose it has in mind, so long as the question is at least 
debatable and the legislature ‘could rationally have decided’ that its classification would 
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The Geometry of Law 
 
As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to 
exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection 
subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his 
passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former 
will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. 
 
- James Madison 
1787215 
 
Certitude is not the test of certainty. We have been cocksure of many 
things that were not so. 
 
- Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. 
1918216 
 
 It was said in Chapter Four that the term equal, as it is used here, means that state 
laws cannot make arbitrary distinctions among people. This, it seems, is the basic idea of 
the rational-basis test. Determining what qualifies as arbitrary will be done here in two 
ways: (1) reason and (2) precedent. Because this chapter sets the filters through which the 
arguments in Chapter Six will be sifted, it is important to establish that because precedent 
is imperfect, the emphasis placed on reason and empiricism imbedded in the Constitution 
can act as a secondary filter and yield similar answers as current precedent.  
 Without an appreciation for the emphasis that was put on reason, some are led to 
believe that modern society warrants a Burkian view, suggesting that the prejudices of 
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tradition are necessary for social order.217 Amy Wax is critical of what she deems 
“rationalists,” who “are skeptical of the notion, associated with conservative thinkers like 
Hayek218 and Burke, that customary norms that emerge organically over time are likely to 
be more beneficial than arrangements that are individually or bureaucratically devised 
through a process of reason.”219 This point may have some cogence in regards to areas 
outside of unalterable traits, but it misses the idea that same-sex relationships are not 
arrived at via reason. With the exception of arranged relationships they are developed no 
differently than different-sex relationships.  
 In another paper regarding same-sex marriage, she eschews the use of reason for 
tradition and quotes Michael Oakeshott: “the rationalist project founders on the 
fundamentally fallacious assumption that ‘what is made is better than what merely 
grows.’”220 Oakeshott, she says, 
 
…opposes the modernist tendency to bring ‘the political, legal, and institutional 
inheritance’ before ‘the tribunal of intellect,’ and to make reason the ultimate 
arbiter of policy and practice. Relying too much on reason does violence to the 
nature of customary practice, which resists the demands of perfect coherence.221 
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This assessment mischaracterizes the same-sex marriage debate. First, Oakeshott makes 
the same mistake as Wax in terms of “what grows.” Same-sex relationships grow where 
there are no prejudiced majorities to persecute them. Marriage has not always and 
everywhere been exclusively heteronormative. More importantly, same-sex couples who 
wish to wed are often in favor of tradition, which is why they want to get married.  
 There are only two things that require the use of reason in this debate: (1) to 
determine if there are relevant differences in marriage as it relates to the state, and (2) to 
determine if those differences will bring harm. If there are empirical answers, then reason 
will extract them, and moreover, to not use reason is to go against the spirit of the 
Constitution. According to Madison, innovation by reason for the benefit of personal 
rights in the face of tradition is characteristically part of the American experiment:  
 
But why is the experiment of an extended republic to be rejected, merely because 
it may comprise what is new? Is it not the glory of the people of America, that, 
whilst they have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other 
nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for 
names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of 
their own situation, and the lessons of their own experience? To this manly spirit, 
posterity will be indebted for the possession, and the world for the example, of 
the numerous innovations displayed on the American theatre, in favor of private 
rights and public happiness.222 
 
 The United States was borne out of the Enlightenment, and it is well known that 
reason was held in high esteem while passions and prejudice were considered 
quintessentially antithetical to the American experiment. The founding fathers referenced 
social contract theorists such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke in their writings. 
Hobbes’s emphasis on science and reason in the area of morals pervades The Federalist 
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Papers. He believed moral philosophers could deduce empirical conclusions about “the 
nature of human actions,” the same way geometricians had revealed the distinct “nature 
of Quantity in Geometricall figures.” The tragedy, he said, was that they hadn’t.223 
 Hobbes used the reference to geometry in multiple writings, and it is no doubt 
what influenced Hamilton to employ the same analogy. They both believed that where 
reason failed, emotive impulses may lead to irrational majorities. “[T]he strength of 
avarice and ambition,” Hobbes said, led to “the vulgar” believing that their opinions are 
related to what is morally right or morally wrong.224 
 Hamilton similarly wrote that in a dispute one can never be sure if one side is 
working on “purer principles than their antagonists.” It must be assumed that “ambition, 
avarice, personal animosity, party opposition…are apt to operate” on both sides.225 
Because of this, reason must remain paramount. When Hamilton wrote Federalist Paper, 
No. 31, he discussed the importance of reason being paramount to passions, or prejudice: 
 
IN DISQUISITIONS of every kind, there are certain primary truths, or first 
principles, upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend. These contain an 
internal evidence which, antecedent to all reflection or combination, commands 
the assent of the mind. Where it produces not this effect, it must proceed either 
from some defect or disorder in the organs of perception, or from the influence of 
some strong interest, or passion, or prejudice. Of this nature are the maxims in 
geometry, that "the whole is greater than its part; things equal to the same are 
equal to one another; two straight lines cannot enclose a space; and all right 
angles are equal to each other." Of the same nature are these other maxims in 
ethics and politics, that there cannot be an effect without a cause; that the means 
ought to be proportioned to the end; that every power ought to be commensurate 
with its object…226 
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 While human action has yet to be reduced to quantifiable bits, the emphasis on 
reason and using tools of inquiry as opposed to other systems that beget knowledge, such 
as divine revelation, was a central tenet in the construction of the United States. There are 
legal scholars in the new natural law227 field who clamorously argue that any homosexual 
conduct should be illegal because it contradicts natural human goods.228 Generally 
informed by Thomas Aquinas, they make egregious errors in their  
reasoning, such as conflating nature and nurture.229 Bertrand Russell summed up the 
problem with Aquinas relative to those who use tools of inquiry: 
 
[Aquinas] does not, like the Platonic Socrates, set out to follow wherever the 
argument may lead. He is not engaged in an inquiry, the result of which it is 
impossible to know in advance. Before he begins to philosophize, he already 
knows the truth; it is declared in the Catholic faith. If he can find apparently 
rational arguments for some parts of the faith, so much the better; if he cannot, he 
need only fall back on revelation. The finding of arguments for a conclusion 
given in advance is not philosophy, but special pleading. I cannot, therefore, feel 
that he deserves to be put on a level with the best philosophers either of Greece 
or of modern times.230 
 
  Because precedent can quickly be dismissed as judicial activism, it deserves 
mention that the conditions required for justification of differential treatment outside of 
precedent, if derived by reason, might yield something in the spirit of John Stuart Mill’s 
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harm principle. In legal philosophy this seems to be the starting point for most western 
liberal democratic theorists.231 Without an empirical claim the legislation is based on the 
circular argument that homosexuality is immoral because homosexuality is immoral. In a 
democracy concerned with the counter-majoritarian difficulty, this is problematic. A 
majority could claim any trait or idea to be immoral or offensive, and ultimately castrate 
the Fourteenth Amendment. In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill writes, 
 
[T]he sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively in 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. 
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others.232 
 
He then extended this same point to offense. 
 
There are many who consider as an injury to themselves any conduct which they 
have a distaste for, and resent it as an outrage to their feelings; as a religious 
bigot, when charged with disregarding the religious feelings of others, has been 
known to retort that they disregard his feelings, by persisting in their abominable 
worship or creed. But there is no parity between the feeling of a person for his 
own opinion, and the feeling of another who is offended at his holding it; no 
more than between the desire of a thief to take a purse, and the desire of the right 
owner to keep it. And a person's taste is as much his own peculiar concern as his 
opinion or his purse.233 
 
 Indeed, considering the subjective values of liberty and equality before the law 
that have been imbued into the Constitution, the moral whims of a majority do not create 
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a logical justification, i.e. a rational basis, for the differential treatment of a minority.234 
While this is important to keep in mind, lest a court ruling be deemed judicial activism, 
the rational-basis test is a product of the court and the reality is that “[t]he life of the law 
has not been logic; it has been experience.”235 Consequently, how the rational-basis test 
has been used historically will now be explored. 
 The root of rational basis review was a simple means-ends test. Only a few years 
after establishing judicial review in Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall 
elucidated the standard for overturning state legislation in McCullouch v. Maryland: 
 
If the end be legitimate, and within the scope of the Constitution, all the means 
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, and which are not 
prohibited, may constitutionally be employed to carry it into effect.236 
 
This standard might have lasted had vicious majorities indifferent to reason not obliged 
the court to establish a level of review that was more challenging for state legislation to 
pass. After Footnote 4 was added and a tiered system of judicial review was established, 
the rational-basis test took the place of the means-ends test.  
 Unfortunately in modern cases there is a discrepancy in the way that courts have 
determined whether a rational basis exists. Currently there are two methods which can be 
used to determine whether something passes the rational-basis test. One, which was 
established in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. in 1911 says, 
 
1. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from 
the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the 
exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done 
                                                
234 For a more in depth discussion see Hart, Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality (1967); also 
see, Williams, Bernard, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (1993). 
235 Oliver Wendell Homes, Jr., The Common Law, (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1881), Kindle edition. 
236 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
 83 
only when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. 
A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause 
merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it 
results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in 
question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, 
the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be 
assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the 
burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is 
essentially arbitrary.237 
 
Around the same time that the Lindsley standard was adopted, there was an adoption of a 
slightly more lenient standard that allowed justices more room for judgment, but still 
under the title of Rational Basis. In Royster Guano v. Virginia it was held that, 
 
[T]he classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some 
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the 
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.238 
 
 The Lindsley standard has a greater emphasis on “complete arbitrariness” and 
“irrationality” that makes it harder to fail;239 that is, there is a greater chance that state 
legislation will not be overturned. The Royster standard allows the court more room to 
consider the goal and how “fair and substantial” the purported legislation is at achieving 
the goal it has set out to accomplish. Regardless of certain standards, “…In recent years, 
the Court has been remarkably inconsistent in setting forth the standard which it is using, 
and the results have reflected this… [and] [a]ttempts to develop a consistent principle 
have so far been unsuccessful.” 240 The Supreme Court has conceded that even “the most 
arrogant legal scholar would not claim that all of these cases cited applied a uniform or 
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consistent test under equal protection principles,”241 and has yet to identify a single, 
practicable method that would provide consistency. In a two year period the court used 
the Lindsley method, the Royster method, and in between those cases it used an 
amalgamation of the two methods. “In short, it is uncertain which formulation of the 
rational basis standard the Court will adhere to [in any given case].”242 
 Whether the original means-ends test is applied, or a newer conception of the 
rational-basis test, it is obvious that the standard at its most restrained will only uphold 
legislation that a state legislature could have reasonably believed would be the means to a 
legitimate end. The rational-basis test in modern adjudication seems to have given more 
deference to the state legislatures than the original means-ends test, but it has also 
become more protective of liberty and equal protection. 
 In 1996 “a jury in rural Wisconsin concluded that school officials violated the 
constitutional rights of a gay teenager”243 by denying him equal protection when they 
permitted other students to bully him in ways that were explicitly stopped for other 
students.244 Also in 1996, Romer v. Evans, was decided. The court wrote that “so long as 
the legislative classification bears a rational relation to some independent and legitimate 
legislative end” the court will uphold a state law, however the Colorado statute “indeed 
defies, even this conventional inquiry.”245 They continued, 
 
[T]he amendment raises the inevitable inference that it is born of animosity 
toward the class that it affects… It is a status-based classification of persons 




244 See Ball, From the Closet to the Courtroom, (2010). (“[The bullies] urinated on him, pretended to rape 
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undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not 
permit.246 
 
 In Lawrence v. Texas (2003) the Supreme Court found that an anti-sodomy law in 
Texas “furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the 
personal and private life of the individual.” It was held that “the provision was ‘born of 
animosity toward the class of persons affected’ and further that it had no rational relation 
to a legitimate governmental purpose.”247 Interestingly, Lawrence acknowledges the 
differences in simple rational basis review and forgoes strict scrutiny:  
 
Laws such as economic or tax legislation that are scrutinized under rational basis 
review normally pass constitutional muster, since “the Constitution presumes that 
even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic 
processes.” We have consistently held, however, that some objectives, such as “a 
bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group,” are not legitimate state 
interests. When a law exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group, we have applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike 
down such laws under the Equal Protection Clause. We have been most likely to 
apply rational basis review to hold a law unconstitutional under the Equal 
Protection Clause where, as here, the challenged legislation inhibits personal 
relationships.248 
 
 Because rational basis review is the most lenient standard of review, the burden 
“is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis 
which might support it.”249 In Heller v. Doe Justice Kennedy articulated the interplay of 
the court’s deference to state legislation and reality: 
 
A State, moreover, has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the 
rationality of a statutory classification. “[A] legislative choice is not subject to 
courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by 
evidence or empirical data.” […][The] courts are compelled under rational basis 
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review to accept a legislature's generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit 
between means and ends. A classification does not fail rational basis review 
because it “is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results 
in some inequality.”250 
 
Significantly he qualifies this statement by setting a boundary: 
 
True, even the standard of rationality as we so often have defined it must find 
some footing in the realities of the subject addressed by the legislation.251 
 
 Given the minimal requirements for a rational basis, we can assess the main 
arguments against same-sex marriage and determine whether there is even a hypothetical 
government interest that could be “reasonably conceived” and is more than a “bare desire 
to harm” a minority group, and at least “find[s] some footing in the realities of the subject 
addressed by the legislation.” The following chapter will distill arguments against same-
sex marriage to establish whether they provide a rational basis for proscription. 
  









I believe that marriage is between a man and woman. It has been for all of 
recorded history and I think this is a temporary aberration that will 
dissipate. I think that it is just fundamentally goes against everything we 
know. 
 
- Newt Gingrich 
2011252 
 
 [M]arriage has always been considered as the union of a man and a 
woman and we have been presented with no authority to the contrary… It 
appears to us that appellants are prevented from marrying, not by the 
statutes of Kentucky … but rather by their own incapability of entering 
into a marriage as that term is defined. 
 
- Court of Appeals of Kentucky 
1973253 
 
Marriage is ingrained on the human conscience as existing solely between 
a man and a woman. That is why this is the only commonly accepted 
arrangement found across all spectrums of religion, race, and culture. 
 
- Ron Crews: President, Massachusetts Family Institute 
2003254 
 
 If same-sex marriage can appropriately be decided in the Supreme Court, and if 
the Equal Protection Clause can appropriately be applied, then the question concomitant 
with the Equal Protection Clause is whether a rational basis for its prohibition can at least 
be thought of as having footing grounded in reality. The purpose of this section is to 
show that the arguments leveled against same-sex marriage do not have such footing.  
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 At the rational basis level of review, the onus is on those who challenge a statute 
to explain why there is no rational basis – even in theory – for its existence. To determine 
whether there is a rational basis for denying equal protection of the laws, we are tasked 
with examining those theoretical arguments to see if “any state of facts reasonably” could 
have been “conceived that would [have] sustain[ed]”255 them.  
 The arguments against same-sex marriage seem to revolve around a few central 
points. This section will distill and consolidate those points. They will be framed in terms 
of the arguments from the California Proposition 8 case and those from Professor Amy 
Wax. 
 
I. Prohibition of same-sex marriage advances the vital state interest in proceeding 
with caution when considering fundamental changes to a vitally important social 
institution. 
 
 One point that gets some traction is that same-sex marriage might have a negative 
effect on different-sex marriage, and because marriage is a “vitally important social 
institution,” that negative effect might implicate the rest of society. Wax acknowledges 
that same-sex marriage could very well help the institution as a whole, but, “[t]he 
alternative is that marriage (and, by extension, society) will suffer if gays are permitted to 
enter into the state of matrimony.”256  
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 She asserts a kind of broken windows thesis257 in regards to sexual 
“devian[ce],”258 noting that same-sex marriage could threaten different-sex marriage 
because “conduct is mediated by social meanings and understandings.”259 In her view,  
 
[C]onservatives are attuned to the crucial role of conventions—including the 
customary forms surrounding established institutions—in promoting moral 
conduct and maintaining the proper functioning of social life…. That social 
norms often serve to restrain self-regarding, irresponsible behavior renders them 
fragile and vulnerable even to remote or obscure effects. Because cultural 
practices are maintained through group consent, conformity is crucial to their 
vitality, and deviant conduct poses a potential threat to their very integrity.260 
 
 This reasoning rests on a circular assumption and it ignores a very crucial point. If 
the fear is that “deviant conduct” might lead to more “deviant conduct,” or to a 
breakdown of marriage, there is a built-in assumption that homosexuality or same-sex 
marriage is deviant. If homosexuality or same-sex marriage were not considered deviant, 
then per her theory, they would not beget forms of sexual deviance, and subsequently 
would not weaken the institution of different-sex marriage. It is precisely the suggestion 
that either are deviant that would allow any person to believe they live in a society that 
condones sexual deviance if same-sex marriage were legal. This argument is predicated 
on the assumption that same-sex marriage is deviant because same-sex marriage is 
deviant. Further, the idea if society consents to X then X is maintained, does not imply if 
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disorder, a society can limit the amount of subsequent deviant behavior. 
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society consents to X and Y then X will not be maintained. Y would have to have some 
negative effect on X, and her point is that deviant behavior has that effect, but as we have 
established it is the assumption of deviance and that assumption’s manifestation, such as 
in laws that prohibit same-sex marriage, which stigmatize same-sex marriage and give it 
the label, deviant.  
 Of course, if it is only the idea of non-conformance that defines deviance then two 
separate points should be made: (1) no two marriages are alike, so why stop at sex? In 
1967 it was argued before the Supreme Court that interracial marriage does not conform 
to normative expectations and is therefore deviant.261 When Wax is concerned that if 
“conventions” and “customary forms” are not held up that this will lead to the demise of 
marriage, she is omitting all of the relevant aspects of marriage that do perpetuate its 
existence outside of genitalia alone. There are many different-sex couples that cannot 
conceive, so the only consistent difference between same-sex relationships and different-
sex relationships is the genitalia. The history of marriage shows that relationships have 
been based on everything from property,262 to punishment,263 to love, to companionship, 
to attraction and so on. Whatever the basis was, and whatever perpetuated its existence in 
society, it has at least been more than the simple matter of genitalia.  
 And (2) it should not be forgotten that sexual orientation is an unalterable trait. 
Whatever the person’s orientation, it does not help the institution of straight-marriage to 
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prevent gay-marriage. It only means that there are less happily (and to be fair, unhappily) 
married couples. 
 We can also appeal to lessons of experience. It seems that just because a minority 
is capable of doing something there is no logical implication that a person in the majority 
will stop doing it. The fact that gays can adopt does not seem to have stopped straight 
people from wanting to adopt. When the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was passed, it didn’t 
appear to cause fewer whites to vote. Proposition 8 in California, which banned same-sex 
marriage, was passed after same-sex marriage had been legal for some time in California 
and it did not repeal legislation that acknowledged same-sex married couples betrothed in 
other states. The counsel defending Prop 8, did not “submit[] one affidavit – not one 
unverified allegation – that a single resident of California either was less likely to get 
married or viewed his or her marriage as less valuable or less stable because California 
had [previously] extended some measure of marriage equality to same-sex couples.”264 
 Theodore Olson argues that “against the background of California’s short, but 
entirely uneventful, experience with providing marriage rights to same-sex couples,” that 
the district court’s finding that same-sex marriage has no discernable negative impact on 
opposite-sex marriage, is unassailable. Without any “reasonable” theory the proponents 
of Prop 8 are asserting that an “unsubstantiated fear of negative externalities of equality is 
sufficient to justify inequality,” which then makes “discrimination self-justifying.”265 The 
Supreme Court has held that in matters of civil rights, even the most deferential 
interpretation of the rational-basis test which assumes the constitutional validity of 
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legislation, must be “rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest,”266 without 
which it is simply “invidious discrimination which offends the Constitution.”267 
 Further, it should be noted that in regards to any such harm that may befall society 
Olson writes in his brief that, 
 
[W]hen the district court asked [the proponents of Prop 8’s] council point blank 
what harm would come to opposite-sex married couples if gay and lesbian 
couples could marry, Proponents’ counsel mustered only, “I don’t know. I don’t 
know.”…. Proponents’ “deinstitutionalization” expert, David Blankenhorn, had 
not seen a seminal 2009 study that empirically tested his theory of 
deinstitutionalization and that concluded that “laws permitting same-sex marriage 
or civil unions have no adverse effect on marriage, divorce, and abortion rates, 
the percent of children born out of wedlock, or the percent of households with 
children under 18 headed by women.”268 
 
 Often the point that opponents of same-sex marriage, including Professor Wax, 
miss is that same-sex couples are not asking for a new institution, or an amendment to the 
current institution of marriage. They are asking for the same legal recognition that 
different-sex couples get. Marriage as it is relevant to the law, does not have any 
conditions to satisfy which require two different sexes. For the purpose of conversation a 
person might differentiate between the parties involved – straight-marriage, gay-
marriage, interracial-marriage – but as far as what is relevant to the state, there need not 
be a distinction between marriage, gay marriage, or interracial marriage.  
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II. Prohibiting same-sex marriage advances the vital state interests of responsible 
procreation and childrearing. 
 
 Wax states that if same-sex couples are recognized as married, “then behavior 
surrounding all marital relations may change in response…. For example…procreation 
might become less central to marriage. This might foster a model of marriage that views 
children as optional or even unimportant.”269 In the fight over Proposition 8 in California 
similar fears were raised. The proponents of Prop 8 cited “the possibility of long-term 
adverse societal consequences.” The proffered reason was that marriage equality might 
“sever[] civil marriage from its traditional procreative purposes, resulting in a corrosion 
of marital norms, including that fathers should take responsibility for the children they 
beget and sexual fidelity…and ultimately social devaluation of marriage as an 
institution.”270  
 Responsible procreation and childrearing has long been an argument of opponents 
of same-sex marriage. As Theodore Olson points out, this concept “encompasses two 
distinct, but related, concepts: First, it addresses the State’s desire to channel those 
heterosexual couples who might beget children ‘by accident’ into marital family units. 
But it also entails a purported interest in raising children in what Proponents [of Prop 8] 
have deemed to be the ‘optimal social structure’ for child development—a man and a 
woman, bound together in marriage, raising children genetically related to both 
parents.”271 In fact, in Traditionalism, Pluralism, and Same-Sex Marriage, Wax points to 
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the importance of a biological connection between parents and children. The problem is 
that the studies she cites in favor of this are not analogous to same-sex couples.  
 She says that “[m]ost relevant to the same-sex marriage debate is the data on 
different types of blended families. In particular, evidence has emerged that stepparent 
families are significantly less beneficial for children than intact nuclear families.”272 It 
doesn’t take much thought to realize that stepparent families might include significant 
differences than families that manage to stay together: potential conflict between parents, 
or the change of authority figures for children for example. She even lauds the fact that 
they controlled for “factors such as ‘parental education, number of siblings, race and 
religion.’”273 But did they control for conflict and success of a relationship? She cites the 
study: 
 
[L]ate adolescents and young adults who had grown up with both biological 
parents performed better on school achievement tests, had fewer children as 
teenagers, finished high school more often, attended college more often, and 
were more likely to be employed in early adulthood than those who had grown 
up with a single parent or a stepparent. Furthermore, although “[c]hildren living 
with a stepparent . . . were almost as well off economically as children living 
with two biological parents,” they nonetheless were “at least as likely as children 
who had lived with a single parent to drop out of high school or to have a baby 
before they turned twenty.” The authors concluded that “[f]or adolescents, the 
economic advantages of having a stepparent seemed to be offset by 
psychological disadvantages.” In sum, parental matrimony measurably benefits 
children, but welfare is most enhanced when both parents are biologically related 
to the child.274 
 
 Equating this study to same-sex marriage is patently dishonest. Single parents 
have their own set of problems with which to contend (the possibility of lacking a model 
for close adult interaction for example), but even comparing same-sex couples to a 
                                                




stepparent model is disingenuous, and confuses correlation and causation. The American 
Psychological Association has written, “[i]f a stepparent is frequently battling his former 
spouse, research shows that his children suffer. But if he is close with his ex-partner, his 
new spouse may feel anxious and insecure. On top of this, say experts, many children 
don't view their step-parents as ‘real parents’ for the first few years—if ever.”275 No 
rational conclusion can be drawn from Wax’s analogy because the implied premise, 
“same-sex couples are equivalent to stepparent couples,” is absurd.  
 There is a substantial amount of research that goes into the best ways for 
stepfamilies to succeed because of the amount of conflict that often develops. Wax is 
correct with her assessment of the children of stepfamilies; after all, it is “the children, 
who often suffer the most through divorce, remarriage and stepfamily situations. They are 
particularly at-risk if their biological parents are in conflict, the divorce situation is 
protracted, they receive less parenting after the divorce or they lose important 
relationships as a result of the divorce…”276 Subsequently, there are many reasons that 
stepfamilies require special attention, but this point only serves to undermine her 
argument. Remarriage is not illegal. Same-sex couples who are in a loving, committed 
relationship and together from a child’s infancy do not exhibit any of the same risks as 
stepfamilies. This point, that marriages which are not positive environments for children 
should be minimized, is not practicable in any sense. If followed to its conclusion, it 
would disallow remarriages, and possibly divorce. But an abusive unhappy first marriage 
is likely worse for the children than a happy second marriage, so that doesn’t work either. 
It is understandable that a state would want to only “reward” families that produce a 
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positive environment for children, but this is not feasible without looking at each 
individual family. 
 In the Prop 8 case opponents of same-sex marriage stated their belief that the 
“‘special recognition and encouragement’ of marriage may be withheld from same-sex 
couples…because they … cannot in any circumstance, create an ‘optimal’ childrearing 
environment.’”277 This claim, however, is not supported by the facts, and subsequently 
cannot substantiate even remote belief, let alone debate.  
 It is indicative of passions or prejudice when biased studies which should fail peer 
review are published making such claims. Sociologist Mark Regnerus recently released a 
study, “New Family Structures Study,”278 that conflicts with thirty years of research. It 
questioned the parenting of LGBT parents and made a number of negative claims. After 
the study was published in a reputable journal, Social Science Research (SSR), some 
eyebrows were raised at the methodology used and possible conflicts of interest in the 
review process. Consequently, an internal audit was conducted by SSR’s editorial board, 
and found that the “peer-review system failed because of ‘both ideology and inattention’ 
on the part of the reviewers.”279  
 They found that there were “significant, disqualifying problems” with the 
methodology and “scholars who should have known better failed to recuse themselves 
from the review process.” 280 The study’s author later admitted, “I said ‘lesbian mothers’ 
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and ‘gay fathers,’ when in fact, I don’t know about their sexual orientation.”281 The 
American Psychological Association issued a scathing assessment of the study and 
further noted that, 
 
On the basis of a remarkably consistent body of research on lesbian and gay 
parents and their children, the American Psychological Association and other 
health, professional, and scientific organizations have concluded that there is no 
scientific evidence that parenting effectiveness is related to parental sexual 
orientation… That is, lesbian and gay parents are as likely as heterosexual 
parents to provide supportive and healthy environments for their children. This 
body of research has shown that the adjustment, development, and psychological 
well-being of children are unrelated to parental sexual orientation and that the 
children of lesbian and gay parents are as likely as those of heterosexual parents 
to flourish.282 
 
 Moreover in November 2011 when a gay-rights issue was before the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Massachusetts, an Amici Curiae brief was submitted on behalf of 
The American Medical Association, The American Psychological Association, The 
American Academy of Pediatrics, The Massachusetts Psychological Association, The 
American Psychiatric Association, and The National Association of Social Workers and 
its Massachusetts Chapter. It addressed, sexual orientation, and sexual orientation as it 
relates to relationships and childrearing. It came to the same conclusion stated above and 
added that they wanted to “emphasize that the abilities of gay and lesbian persons as 
parents and the positive outcomes for their children are not areas where credible 
scientific researchers disagree.”283 
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 In fact, the expert witness which the opponents of same-sex marriage relied on in 
the Proposition 8 case, “Paul Nathanson testified in his deposition that peer-reviewed 
studies of the effect of permitting gay men and lesbians to marry on the rearing of 
children ‘don’t detect problems and they don’t predict problems.’”284 
 As for the possibility that the prohibition of same-sex marriage will “‘increase[e] 
the likelihood’ that heterosexual couples with the capacity to procreate accidentally will 
marry,”285 there is no rational reason a person can come to this conclusion. In fact there is 
such a lack of reality to this premise that the proponents of Prop 8, merely stated that this 
would be the case, but made “no argument at all” to support the premise “that prohibiting 
same-sex couples from entering relationships designated marriage will make it more 
likely that heterosexual couples in California will marry.”286 
 If laws prohibiting same-sex marriage were really geared toward rewarding 
procreation they would not legally be able to leave out the numerous other groups that 
cannot procreate.287 Omitting other groups makes this argument “so woefully 
underinclusive as to render belief in [its purported end] a challenge to the credulous.”288 
Further, while these groups are different, that 
 
difference is “irrelevant unless [same-sex couples] would threaten [Proponents’ 
interest] in a way that other [infertile heterosexual couples] would not.” Same-
sex couples pose no such unique threat to Proponents’ efforts to channel 
instances of accidental procreation into marriage, and thus the same-sex nature of 
the union is not a “rational[] justif[ication]” for singling them out for disfavored 
treatment.289 
 
                                                







If the prohibition of same-sex marriage “is intended to reserve ‘special recognition’ of 
marriage for couples that can procreate ‘by accident,’ it ‘ma[k]e[s] no sense in light of 
how [it] treat[s] other groups similarly situated in relevant respects.’”290 
 Responsible procreation and childrearing might be a vital state interest, but it is 
decidedly separate from same-sex marriage. It does not provide justification beyond 
“invidious discrimination,” considering the various other groups that can marry, remarry, 
and raise children.  
 
III. Slippery slope argument: If same-sex marriage is allowed, then bigamy, adult 
incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, obscenity and/or 
pedophilia might become legal. 
 
 Slippery slope arguments are generally problematic because they use extreme 
hypotheticals to leverage fear about the issue at hand. In the case of same-sex marriage, 
slippery slope arguments are invoked to make one of two conclusions: (1) it will lead to 
society slowly accepting the extreme scenario’s (which they find unpleasant), or (2) if a 
state cannot engage in legal moralism, the Supreme Court will be able to strike down 
laws against these extreme hypotheticals, which would implicate all victimless crimes. 
 The first issue is one of social mores and less concerned with the court. As the 
argument goes, if social mores change then laws may be passed which allow things like 
bestiality or prostitution. A person may service a goat, or take money in exchange for sex, 
but the impetus to do either of those things is not a trait completely inseparable from their 
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person. Money is an artifact of society, so it cannot be argued to be inseparable from the 
individual. Considering the development of sexual orientation occurs internally it is 
necessarily separate from the external world, including other animals. As it was stated in 
the introduction, there may be social constructs which lead to situational sexual behavior, 
and that may very well be what leads to bestiality, but the drive to have sex with animals, 
is at the very least something that occurs external to the individual.  
 Perhaps more importantly, the fear that society will learn to accept bestiality if 
they accept homosexuality, misses something else entirely. It can only be claimed that 
there is any parity between the two, if sexual activity is looked at in such a narrow sense 
as to have a single isolated end: orgasm. In that case, it would necessarily implicate 
heterosexual acts as well. Indeed, those who fear that an approval of homosexuality may 
lead to an approval of bestiality, do so because in their mind there is nothing more to 
homosexuality than the sexual act itself – nothing more than the absolute end of orgasm: 
 
Those who propound “gay” ideology or theories of same-sex marriage or “sexual 
activity” have no principled moral case to offer against (prudent and moderate) 
promiscuity, indeed the getting of orgasmic sexual pleasure in whatever friendly 
touch or welcoming orifice (human or otherwise) one may opportunely find it 
in.291 
 
Of course, just as in different-sex relationships – even the casual one-night stand – there 
is usually more than the single end of orgasm. As soon as a concept slightly more 
abstract, like intimacy, is added it would separate both heterosexual human relationships 
and homosexual human relationships from bestiality. There is nothing inherent about 
homosexuality that makes it any closer to bestiality than heterosexuality, so there is no 
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logical justification to prohibit one and not the other. But with all that said, regarding 
purely what society does and does not accept is not the concern of the court. What is the 
concern of the court is the second argument. 
 All of the examples which opponents of gay rights or same-sex marriage offer can 
be prohibited by the state without the legalization of same-sex marriage affecting them 
because prostitution, bigamy, incest, and so on are all defined and driven by external as 
opposed to internal factors and therefore do not engage the Equal Protection Clause. 
Bigamy for example is often thrown around as if the court would not be able to discern a 
difference. Consider the argument. Bigamy is not rooted on anything fundamentally 
inseparable from the person. It is only a condition of want grounded in external factors; as 
in a person might change their mind and not want it later. People cannot change their 
mind about their sexual orientation, and while some of them certainly want to get 
married, that want is not isolated. If the Equal Protection Clause were used in situations 
composed purely of want, it would become utterly meaningless. Segregationists want 
segregation, “traditionalists” want only their version of marriage recognized by the state, 
and just like Mill pointed out, thieves want the victim’s purse.  
 If sexual orientation occurs internally, and is an immutable part of that person 
then same-sex marriage is only the manifestation of that inseparable quality, and that 
manifestation produces no harm. All of the hypothetical victimless crimes result from no 
such internal trait that is inseparable from the individual, and therefore the state may 
engage in all the moral legislation that it like without the court interfering. It only 
becomes repugnant to the Constitution when morals legislation arbitrarily treats groups of 
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persons unequally.292 The Supreme Court has said that in the case of equal protection, 
“mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly 




 One argument that is often used is that of semantics: that the definition of 
marriage will not support same-sex marriage. To these people, saying same-sex marriage 
is akin to saying round square. The very meaning of marriage just cannot support the 
concept of a same-sex couple. Of course, as Adele Mercier, has pointed out, this confuses 
meaning and reference.  
 
The meanings of all words of all languages, with the exception of proper names 
(which refer all and only to well-defined single objects, i.e. to a person), always 
stretch beyond their current reference. The word ‘Canadians’ currently applies to 
a different group of people than it applied to a hundred years ago, and than it will 
apply to a hundred years hence…. Words can undergo reference changes without 
a change in meaning…. before Emancipation, the word ‘citizen’ had never been 
applied to Blacks in the US, it would follow from [the semantic argument] that, 
as a matter of necessity, Blacks cannot be citizens.294  
 
Note that she does not mean that according to the semantic argument they shouldn’t be 
citizens, as was debated during the reconstruction amendments, but rather that despite 
any amendments, if the semantic argument is to hold, they couldn’t be citizens. 
Importantly, she goes on to say that those who make this argument are committed to the 
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view “that Emancipation, by extending its reference, changed the very meaning of the 
word ‘citizen’.”295 That is, they are “committed to the view that, after Emancipation, even 
Whites were no longer citizens according to the usual meaning of that term in the 
language.”296 In this same vein, if the semantic argument against same-sex marriage were 
to be sustained, it would follow that when Massachusetts declared that same-sex couples 
could legally be recognized as married, all married heterosexual couples in the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts were no longer married “according to the usual 
meaning of that term.”  
 As far as the legal conditions require, the term marriage fully supports same-sex 
couples. While some religions may not approve, per the First Amendment, the state has 
no interest in respecting any one religion. It seems that it is the distinct difference 
between the meaning of the word marriage in civic and religious circles that leads to the 
semantic argument.  
 In her affidavit submitted to the Canadian court system in 2001, she made the 
point that in Canada there are two distinct concepts of marriage, and this, it seems, is 
similar to the case in the United States. 
 
[Religious marriages and civil marriages] are properly distinct, not only in 
contemporary consciousness but in the religious and legal institutions that are 
commonly understood to underlie such concepts. That is demonstrated by the fact 
that a religious marriage is not recognized by Canadian law as a legal marriage 
unless it is authorized by the state to be a legal marriage, and that not all legal 
marriages are recognized as religious marriages.  
 
Various grounds suffice for a religious marriage to be annulled in some religions; 
but an annulment even by the Pope does not constitute in and of itself the 
dissolution of a legal marriage. 
 




The Anglican Church did not recognize as a religious marriage the Duke of 
Windsor’s civil marriage to Mrs. Simpson because she had previously divorced. 
Many religions do not recognize as religious marriage the legal (or religious) 
marriages of one of their members with someone of a different religion. 
 
It is one of the foundational principles of logic (known as Leibniz’s law from the 
philosopher of the same name) that two things are identical if and only if they 
have all and only the same relevant properties. Religious marriages and civil 
marriages have some but not all of their relevant properties in common. Hence 
they are distinct.297 
 
Mercier notes that “[i]t is an empirical issue, not one of norms, whether gays and lesbians 
have the capacities required for marriage.”298 The conditions that have defined marriage 
across time and culture have changed. The state’s purpose for involving itself in marriage 
in the first place, to limit clandestine marriages, is not affected by the sex of the two 
people getting married. 
 
 







The Subjection of Gays and Lesbians 
 
[O]ne feels that among all the lessons which men require for carrying on 
the struggle against the inevitable imperfections of their lot on earth, there 
is no lesson which they more need, than not to add to the evils which 
nature inflicts, by their jealous and prejudiced restrictions on one another. 
Their vain fears only substitute other and worse evils for those which they 
are idly apprehensive of: while every restraint on the freedom of conduct 
of any of their human fellow-creatures…dries up pro tanto the principal 
fountain of human happiness, and leaves the species less rich, to an 
inappreciable degree, in all that makes life valuable to the individual 
human being. 
 
- John Stuart Mill 
1869299 
 
 The principle agent of change in a republic is social attitude. A change in attitudes 
will foster change in legislation and in extreme cases a constitutional amendment. If the 
amendment provokes emotive responses there are often predictable attempts to subvert 
every manifestation of that amendment. In these cases, it requires a “guardians of rights,” 
to stop states from violating what has already been adopted in the Constitution. It is an 
unfortunate truth that just because something is constitutionally protected does not mean 
that in practice it will be. Sometimes it is because the legislatures and the Supreme Court 
are mistaken about the facts, and sometimes it is because those legislatures are motivated 
by the “influence of some strong interest, or passion, or prejudice.”300 Whether it’s The 
Birmingham News’s declaration that it would explicitly contravene the Constitution or 
the century discrepancy between the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment (1870), and the 
                                                
299 John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women, 4th ed. (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 
1878), 194, http://books.google.com/ebooks. 
300 Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist Papers: No. 31,” The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History, and 
Diplomacy, last modified 2008, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed31.asp. 
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passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 which allowed the Fifteenth Amendment to 
become a reality, sometimes emotive impulses disregard reason and flout the 
Constitution. That the Constitution protects same-sex marriage will probably not be 
recognized by the states for some time, and if the Supreme Court should figure it out 
before the states, and act, those states will predictably claim judicial activism, just as they 
did in 1954.  
 Fortunately, for the LGBT community, the court has acknowledged the facts and 
sexual orientation has been recognized over the last two decades as being covered by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. First in Romer v. Evans, and then further in Lawrence v. Texas. 
In her concurring opinion of Lawrence, Justice O’Conner eloquently explained why laws 
aimed at same-sex couples but not opposite-sex couples do not pass the rational-basis 
test: 
 
The statute at issue here makes sodomy a crime only if a person “engages in 
deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.” Tex. Penal 
Code Ann. § 21.06(a) (2003). Sodomy between opposite-sex partners, however, 
is not a crime in Texas. That is, Texas treats the same conduct differently based 
solely on the participants. Those harmed by this law are people who have a same-
sex sexual orientation and thus are more likely to engage in behavior prohibited 
by § 21.06. Texas' sodomy law brands all homosexuals as criminals, thereby 
making it more difficult for homosexuals to be treated in the same manner as 
everyone else. Indeed, Texas itself has previously acknowledged the collateral 
effects of the law, stipulating in a prior challenge to this action that the law 
“legally sanctions discrimination against [homosexuals] in a variety of ways 
unrelated to the criminal law,” including in the areas of “employment, family 
issues, and housing.”  
 
This case raises a different issue than Bowers: whether, under the Equal 
Protection Clause, moral disapproval is a legitimate state interest to justify by 
itself a statute that bans homosexual sodomy, but not heterosexual sodomy. It is 
not. Moral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an 
interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal 
Protection Clause. See, e. g., Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S., at 
534; Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S., at 634-635. Indeed, we have never held that 
moral disapproval, without any other asserted state interest, is a sufficient 
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rationale under the Equal Protection Clause to justify a law that discriminates 
among groups of persons. 
 
Moral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under 
the Equal Protection Clause because legal classifications must not be “drawn for 
the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.” Id., at 633. Texas' 
invocation of moral disapproval as a legitimate state interest proves nothing more 
than Texas' desire to criminalize homosexual sodomy. But the Equal Protection 
Clause prevents a State from creating “a classification of persons undertaken for 
its own sake.” Id., at 635. And because Texas so rarely enforces its sodomy law 
as applied to private, consensual acts, the law serves more as a statement of 
dislike and disapproval against homosexuals than as a tool to stop criminal 
behavior. The Texas sodomy law “raise[s] the inevitable inference that the 
disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons 
affected.”301 
 
 Some will see decisions like Romer and Lawrence and they will argue that morals 
changed, and so the Supreme Court is “imposing upon all Americans the resolution 
favored by the elite class from which the Members of [the court] are selected, 
pronouncing that ‘animosity’ toward homosexuality is evil.”302 But this misunderstands 
the nature of a written constitution. The court doesn’t need to believe that animosity 
towards homosexuality is evil to see that a person and all that is concomitant with that 
term is protected by the Equal Protection Clause, unless there is a rational basis for not 
allowing it. It is an unfortunate bout of adjudicating by morals when a justice understands 
that a provision’s reference necessarily broadens in the context of new facts, but not 
when they personally disagree with it. This, however, has been the history of civil-rights 
struggles.  
 While majority rules in a democracy, Justice Brennan once observed, “faith in 
democracy is one thing, blind faith quite another.”303 The problem of passions and 
                                                
301 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (O’Conner, concurring.) 
302 See supra note 53. 
303 Justice Willaim J. Brennan, Jr., “Speech to the Text and Teaching Symposium,” (1985), in Originalism: 
A Quarter Century of Debate, ed. Steven G. Calabresi (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, inc., 2007). 
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prejudice tyrannizing a minority in spite of the Constitution is why in a democracy people 
would vest in “electorally unaccountable justices” the power to overturn democratically 
adopted legislation. It is part of the counter-majoritarian difficulty to ask “…Which 
values…qualify as sufficiently important or fundamental…to be vindicated by the Court 
against other values affirmed by legislative acts?”304  
 In the Fourteenth Amendment the value of equal protection was explicitly 
demarcated, and if the court acts accordingly, it can only strike down state legislation that 
conflicts with it. It has been said that for a constitutional democracy to maintain 
legitimacy justices must adhere to the provisions in a constitution as they were originally 
understood – they ought to value judicial restraint. Those who have put forward ideas of 
Originalism in a specific sense, are emphatic about how restrained their methods are, and 
believe themselves resilient for being able to administer such “strong medicine.”305 But 
under scrutiny, the problem with their methods are not just that they are too specific, it is 
that they are often only specific in areas that they don’t want to see rights expanded. 
Looking for an original understanding of a provision at a specific level is problematic 
when an original consensus did not exist, but even more problematic is when a justice 
adheres tightly to original moral perceptions and upholds a statute specifically antithetical 
to the purpose of the amendment.  
 It has often been put forward that sexual orientation is not covered by the Equal 
Protection Clause because it was not considered during the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and therefore not part of its meaning. This, however, confuses meaning and 
reference.  
                                                
304 See supra note 67. 
305 Scalia, “Originalism: The Lesser Evil,” (1989). 
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 The 39th Congress had the opportunity to make the Equal Protection Clause 
specific; they declined. They opted instead for an amendment that meant laws must be 
applied equally to all persons without exception. Of course, exceptions do occur, as they 
do with all amendments, but as the court later clarified the exceptions must have some 
justification, and those justifications must have some footing in reality.  
 Two points float to the top in regards to the Fourteenth Amendment’s application 
to sexual orientation: (1) Homosexuality was around, but the facts surrounding it – 
orientation not being a choice, it being immutable, and it not being harmful to society – 
were unknown. This is analogous to Bork’s segregation point: when the facts (social or 
otherwise) that define something are discovered to be different than previously thought 
and this discovery establishes that an amendment is plainly being broken, “it is obvious 
the Court must choose equality and prohibit state-imposed”306 laws that defy the 
Constitution. (2) As evidenced by the quotes that open up Chapter Six, the concept of 
same-sex marriage, in the U.S. at least, is a new phenomenon. It therefore requires some 
kind of assessment of trajectory. Considering the absolute character the phrase “equal 
protection of the laws” was given, that trajectory should easily cover sexual orientation, 
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